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Social enterprises generate revenue to solve social, humanitarian, and
ecological problems. Their products are not a means to the end of profits,
but rather profits are a means to the end of their production. This dynamic
presents many of the same corporate governance issues facing other for-
profit firms, including legal compliance. The author contends, however,
that traditional strategies for corporate compliance are incongruent to the
social enterprise’s unique normative framework. Specifically, traditional
compliance theory, with its prioritization of shareholder interests, stands at
odds with the social enterprise’s mission-driven purpose. Attention to this
distinction is essential for developing effective compliance and enforcement
policies in the future. Indeed, arguably the greatest feature of the social
enterprise is its potential to harness organizational characteristics that in-
spire the values and culture most closely linked with ethical behavior—
without resort to more costly or intrusive measures.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
I. EMERGENCE OF THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II. TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
III. LIMITS OF TRADITIONAL COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES . . . . . 10
A. General Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B. Specific Issues for Social Enterprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Normative Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2. Additional Practical and Political
Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
IV. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AND THE SHIFT TO VALUES-BASED
COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A. Integration of Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. The Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2. The Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B. Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
C. Power of Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. New Standard Form Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
* Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law. My thanks go to Paul
Gowder, Emily Hughes, Lyman Johnson, Mike Koehler, Haskell Murray, Todd Pettys, Jason
Yackee, Charles Yockey, and Sze Sze Yockey for their helpful comments and conversations. I
am also grateful to Stephen Kirschner and Xiao Xiao for their excellent research support,
and to Dean Gail Agrawal for the summer research stipend that made this project possible.
For Emma.
1
2 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 4:1
2. Why the New Forms Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3. Form and Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
V. CONSEQUENCES AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
A. Hire the Right People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
B. Engage with Stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
C. Promote Board Heterogeneity and Diversity of
Expertise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
D. Reassess Enforcement Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
E. Prioritize Collaboration and Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Whoever walks righteously and speaks honestly, who spurns what is gained by
oppression, who waves off contact with a bribe . . . that one shall dwell on




Social enterprises strive to make the world a better place.  They use
market-based strategies and techniques to advance a specific social mis-
sion.  Even though they organize as for-profit companies, the pursuit of
money comes second to advancing the public good: profits are the means
to an end, rather than an end in and of themselves.  Social enterprises’ key
point of departure from charities and other socially responsible companies
is that neither financial gain nor charity is ever incidental to other objec-
tives.  According to Brakman Reiser, they “pursue social and business
goals together, viewing them as synergistic and mutually reinforcing, as
equal partners in their business vision.”1
As a continuously expanding and evolving business model, social en-
terprises come in all shapes and sizes.  Some work to alleviate the sanita-
tion crisis in Africa by franchising affordable public toilets.2  Others focus
on hiring hard-to-employ individuals3 or designing products for the clean-
energy sector.4  Many social enterprises are closely held start-up corpora-
1. Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2450
(2009); see also Briana Cummings, Note, Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce a Mandate to
Promote the Public Interest, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 578, 582 (2012) (noting that social enter-
prises “serve two ‘co-equal’ masters (two bottom lines) at once,” measuring success in terms
of both financial and social performance).
2. Jonathan Kalan, The Silicon Valley of Shit: Nairobi is Ground Zero for Sanitation
Innovation, GOOD (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.good.is/posts/the-silicon-valley-of-shit-nai-
robi-is-ground-zero-for-sanitation-innovation.
3. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215, 227
(2013) (describing business model of the social enterprise Greyston Bakery).
4. See, e.g., March of the Lettuce Bot, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 2012, at 5, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21567202-robotics-machine-helps-let
tuce-farmers-just-one-several-robots (describing innovations in pesticide-reducing robots by
Blue River Technology).
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tions, but that is certainly not the only option.5  The common thread across
the field is that all social enterprises, in addition to serving the public
good, are firms.  They need to do the things that every firm needs to do:
they must raise capital, generate income, hire talent, and train employees.
They also need to worry about legal compliance.
In some respects the compliance concerns facing a social enterprise are
no different than the ones facing every company.  Agency costs are never
zero.  As long as humans join in a common enterprise, the risks of cheat-
ing, fraud, shirking, and other forms of corporate malfeasance will remain.
That said, matters become more nuanced in a social enterprise.  Tradi-
tional compliance strategies focus on protecting shareholder wealth, typi-
cally by monitoring corporate agents and threatening them with sanctions
if they engage in illegality or self-dealing.  Of course, social enterprises
must also be mindful of monitoring, but a shareholder-centric vision of
compliance is largely incompatible with their overarching emphasis on
mission rather than profits.  Moreover, what might seem like sensible tac-
tics in other for-profit firms, such as extensive surveillance and the risk of
monetary penalties, can actually undercut compliance efforts in a social
enterprise because they encourage agents to prioritize one’s self-interest
above other values.  In the end, social enterprises need a compliance the-
ory that does not just speak in terms of shareholders and strict cost-benefit
analyses.  They need one that captures the delicate balance at the heart of
their hybrid purpose.
This Article has three primary goals.  First, it will explore whether
there is anything unique or special about social enterprises when it comes
to compliance with the law and matters of business ethics.  Second, after
answering that question in the affirmative, it will discuss what this finding
means for strategies of internal compliance and public enforcement policy.
Finally, it will argue that the potential compliance benefits of organizing as
a social enterprise represent one of the most compelling justifications so
far for supporting the social enterprise movement and continuing its close
study.  Put simply, the social enterprise’s mission-centric nature and con-
comitant organizational characteristics set up nicely to inspire a corporate
culture that makes ethical conduct more likely to occur.  This has impor-
tant implications for the regulators, investors, employees, and consumers
who interact with these firms, and it is something that even the most cyni-
cal skeptics of social enterprise theory should celebrate.
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides background on the
origins, characteristics, and growth of the social enterprise sector.  Part II
5. See Brett H. McDonnell, Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary
Duty in Benefit Corporations 8 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Research Paper No. 14-21, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2423346; see, e.g., BEN & JERRY’S, http://www.benjerry.com/values (last visited
Sept. 25, 2014) (“Our Social Mission compels us to use our Company in innovative ways to
make the world a better place.”); PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/us/patagonia.go?as
setid=2329 (last visited Sept. 25, 2014) (“[W]e came to realize our environmental and social
responsibilities, and then began to act on them.”).
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looks at the range of compliance issues that arise for all firms and dis-
cusses traditional compliance theories.  Part III then explains the limita-
tions of those theories, with Part IV offering specific reasons why social
enterprises should be treated differently.  Part V concludes by proposing
new approaches to governance and enforcement that will match and rein-
force the social enterprise’s distinctive qualities.
I. EMERGENCE OF THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
The notion that a business can make money while advancing the public
interest is not new.  Whether through the sale of pharmaceuticals, electric
cars, or organic produce, for centuries there have been companies hoping
to earn profits by finding solutions to social problems.  The inherently con-
tractual nature of corporate law means that corporate constituents are free
to pursue whatever objective they can agree upon and to which the market
will respond.6  For-profit firms also provide many ancillary social bene-
fits—such as jobs—and often claim to be operating for the public good,
even if their only goal is profit, since capitalism presumes that the pursuit
of profit is de facto in the public interest.7
However, there is growing attraction to a business model that more
closely and powerfully aligns with a distinctly social purpose.8  This is
partly a reaction to the widely held perception that most for-profit corpo-
rations focus solely on maximizing shareholder wealth, showing little re-
gard for the negative social or environmental consequences of their
actions.9  Some commentators even suggest that corporate directors and
managers owe a legal duty to put profits ahead of every other concern.10
For the most part, the suggestion that corporations must maximize profits
at all costs has been discredited.11  Legally and practically, corporate con-
6. See Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the
Theory of the Firm, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273, 281–82, 288 (2014) (describing contractual
flexibility of corporations through charters and bylaws); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 101(b) (2012) (providing that Delaware corporations may be formed to conduct “any law-
ful business or purposes”).
7. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970.
8. See McDonnell, supra note 5, at 7–8.
9. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, To Be or Not to Be (A Security): Funding For-
Profit Social Enterprises, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 299, 301 (2013); Robert T. Esposito, The
Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on Emerging Corporate Entities in
Europe and the United States and the Case for Benefit Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L.
REV. 639, 661–62 (2013).
10. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 733, 736 (2005) (recognizing but criticizing the belief that “traditional fiduciary duties
require corporate managers . . . to maximize corporate profits”); Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001) (“[T]here is
today a broad normative consensus that shareholders alone are the parties to whom corpo-
rate managers should be accountable . . . .”).
11. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 163, 169 (2008) (“Do [state corporate statutes] . . . limit the corporate purpose to share-
Fall 2014] The Compliance Case for Social Enterprise 5
trollers are free to make any business decisions they see fit, including ones
that sacrifice profit in the name of performing a social good.12  Yet,
whether they take to the streets as part of Occupy Wall Street or not, large
swathes of the population look skeptically at the behavior of traditional
corporations.13  Corporations generate a tremendous amount of good, but
they also fan the fires of problems like corruption, climate change, pov-
erty, and dangerous working conditions.  Disasters such as the British Pe-
troleum oil spill and the Bangladeshi clothing factory collapse, to say
nothing of the lasting aftershocks of the global financial crisis, only add
extra grist to the mill.
The concept of a social enterprise came out of this environment.  More
and more people want companies to be truly good; they want to support
and work for companies that put principles of sustainability, fair wages,
fair trade, and overall public benefit at the center of their business strate-
gies, even if doing so means slightly lower profits.14  Social enterprises
seek to meet this demand.  These are businesses that pursue social good as
their core mission, sometimes broadly and sometimes more narrowly, but
always with a purpose of making money to solve unmet social problems,
rather than solving social problems to make money.  They look like tradi-
tional firms in the sense that they engage in commercial activity and gener-
ate revenue by selling products or charging fees.  However, they do all of
this while following the mantra of “profit with a purpose.”15  Isolated add-
on practices that are consistent with the tenets of Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility (CSR)—such as paying fair wages—are not enough.  Social
enterprises originate instead from commitments to larger values (e.g., so-
cial justice or environmental sustainability) and apply those values to
every strategic decision.
Until recently, founders of a social enterprise would have initially been
drawn to the nonprofit form.  But now they increasingly choose the social
holder wealth maximization? . . . hell no.”). See generally Judd F. Sneirson, Green is Good:
Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV.
987 (2009).
12. See M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market
for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 572 (2009); see also Mark A. Underberg, Benefit
Corporations vs. “Regular” Corporations: A Harmful Dichotomy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 13, 2012, 8:31 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/
2012/05/13/benefit-corporations-vs-regular-corporations-a-harmful-dichotomy/ (discussing di-
rectors’ ability to consider interests of other constituencies).
13. See Robert J. Bies, Reducing Criminal Wrongdoing within Business Organizations:
The Practical and Political Skills of Integrity, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 225, 226–27 (2014).
14. See Julie Battilana et al., In Search of the Hybrid Ideal, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION
REV. 51, 55 (2012); Hans Rawhouser et al., The Diffusion of New Legal Forms for Social
Hybrids (Mar. 20, 2014) (working paper) (on file with author); Charlotte Seager, Generation
Y: Why Young Job Seekers Want More Than Money, GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2014, 1:59 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/social-enterprise-network/2014/feb/19/generation-y-millennials-
job-seekers-money-financial-security-fulfilment.
15. Wendy Stubbs, Investigation of Emerging Sustainable Business Models (July 11,
2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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enterprise model in order to reduce dependency on donations and bolster
their sustainability by tapping the same capital markets that launch tradi-
tional for-profit firms.16  The lingering difference between a social enter-
prise and a traditional corporation is that the former’s goal of providing
returns to shareholders comes second to an overriding goal of social per-
formance.17  In fact, one of the biggest challenges for a social enterprise is
avoiding so-called mission drift, where the pursuit of profit starts to over-
shadow the pursuit of public benefit.18
Sanergy is a good example of a firm matching the archetypal descrip-
tion of a social enterprise.  Recognizing that over half the Kenyan popula-
tion lacks access to adequate sanitation, Sanergy attempts to mitigate that
problem by building and franchising low-cost, pay-per-use sanitation sys-
tems called Fresh Life Toilets.19  Sanergy’s toilets are a welcome sight in
Nairobi’s slums, where previously the only affordable options were pit la-
trines that had an unfortunate habit of flooding.20  While this might be
reason enough for enthusiasm about Sanergy, the company does even
more.  Its toilets feature a proprietary system that makes it easy to collect
16. See Battilana et al., supra note 14, at 52–53. Though nonprofits can and often do
earn income from their activities—think of an art museum’s ticket prices and gift shop—they
do not feature traditional equity shareholders and are restricted in how they can use the
revenue they generate. For example, nonprofits cannot distribute earnings to directors, man-
agers, trustees, or members without risking their tax-exempt status. This constraint on distri-
butions, arguably the defining feature of the nonprofit, helps to lock assets into the
organization’s social objective, but it cabins the ability to attract capital. Joseph W. Yockey,
Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2389024.
17. There is a potential source of confusion between social enterprises and firms that
claim to follow particular social or religious beliefs. For example, Hobby Lobby has been a
mainstay in the news following the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. (2014) (No. 13-354, 2013 Term) (holding that the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services may not require closely held corporations to provide
certain health insurance coverage for methods of contraception that violate the sincerely held
religious beliefs of their owners). Hobby Lobby is a closely held corporation whose owners
are Evangelical Christians. They state an intention to run their business “in a manner consis-
tent with Biblical principles.” Id. slip op. at 14. This commitment informs their attitudes to-
ward specific social issues: Hobby Lobby stores close for business on Sundays, they refuse to
engage in profitable transactions that promote alcohol, they donate corporate funds to Chris-
tian charities, and they object to certain forms of contraception. Id. These activities reflect a
desire to impact society in ways that are consistent with their religious beliefs, but they do not
transform their business into a social enterprise. Hobby Lobby’s social emphasis remains
incidental to its primary revenue-generating activity of selling retail craft supplies. Stated
another way, Hobby Lobby “does not exist first and foremost to solve a social problem,”
which is the defining characteristic of a social enterprise as the term is used in this Article.
Keren G. Raz, Toward an Improved Legal Form for Social Enterprise, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 283, 289–90 (2012).
18. Battilana et al., supra note 14, at 53.
19. Sanergy: Creating a Sustainable Sanitation Cycle in Kenya, ACUMEN, http://acumen
.org/investment/sanergy/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2014).
20. See Kalan, supra note 2.
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waste and convert it to electricity and fertilizer.21  These are two scarce
commodities in the region that the company’s franchisees can sell on the
open market.  This helps African farmers and makes energy more afforda-
ble, all while easing Kenya’s sanitation crisis.
Other social enterprises focus less on products that solve social
problems and more on how they can generate public good through their
everyday operations.  Hot Bread Kitchen and Greyston Bakery are both
bakeries that sell a wide selection of high-quality breads, but, uniquely,
they also adhere to strict workforce development programs.  Each com-
pany staffs its operations with hard-to-employ individuals, such as low-
income immigrants, and actively teaches them skills that they can apply
when looking for jobs across the wider foodservices industry.22  In this
way, the companies combine two previously separate models: a charitable
model akin to a classic nonprofit that guides their hiring and training prac-
tices, and a profit-making model that tracks the traditional corporation
and drives fiscal health.23  Greyston Bakery’s slogan says it all: “We don’t
hire people to bake brownies. We bake brownies to hire people.”24
No matter what social enterprises do, though, their legal form does not
define them.  A social enterprise may organize as a corporation, a partner-
ship, a cooperative, or an LLC.  It might also choose one of several new
statutory forms that facilitate the social enterprise movement.  Options in
the latter category include the benefit corporation, the L3C, and the flexi-
ble-purpose corporation.25  Perhaps most notably, the progress being
made in this sector blurs the lines between for-profit and non-profit com-
panies.26  On one hand, social enterprises advance the philanthropic pur-
suits of non-profits through the equity and revenue-sharing strategies of
for-profits.  On the other, they attempt to go farther than traditional so-
cially responsible for-profit corporations by uniting social and economic
goals within a single, mutually reinforcing strategy.27  Social enterprises
thus carve out a distinct place in the market—a “fourth sector” of the
economy.28  They also raise a variety of novel theoretical and practical
21. Id.
22. See Plerhoples, supra note 3, at 227 (describing the business model of the social
enterprise Greyston Bakery); HOT BREAD KITCHEN, http://hotbreadkitchen.org (last visited
Oct. 20, 2014).
23. Battilana et al., supra note 14, at 51.
24. GREYSTON BAKERY, http://greyston.com (last visited Aug. 7, 2014).
25. See McDonnell, supra note 5, at 4.
26. See Rawhouser et al., supra note 14, at 5 (describing spread and common features
of social enterprise legislation).
27. Battilana et al., supra note 14, at 52.
28. See Andrew J. Hoffman et al., Hybrid Organizations as Agents of Positive Social
Change: Bridging the For-Profit and Non-Profit Divide 15 (Mich. Ross Sch. of Bus. Working
Paper No. 1149, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=16750
69; Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 337, 338–41 (2009).
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issues.29  The focus here is on one issue that has yet to garner much atten-
tion: legal compliance.
II. TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
All firms entertain the risk of wrongdoing.  Corporate history is replete
with cases where bad actors did bad things, as well as plenty of examples
where well-meaning people behaved illegally or unethically for potential
personal gain.  The ongoing search for ways to allay opportunism and
other agency costs is arguably the cornerstone of corporate law.30  This is a
big reason why casebooks in business associations devote so much atten-
tion to fiduciary duties and shareholder derivative suits.  It also explains
the strong corporate enforcement presence at the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  Companies
will, through their agents, always misbehave.  Other people and methods
exist to try to stop them.
“Compliance” is the general term used to describe the rules, policies,
and systems that firms use to detect and deter agent misconduct within
their ranks.31  Much of the focus is on preventing legal and accounting
violations.  But, compliance programs must also address unethical, albeit
not criminal, actions and encourage adherence to organizational objectives
in general.  The dominant approach to promoting compliance stems from
rational choice theory.32  This theory presumes that individuals make deci-
sions about whether to comply with rules in light of their rational self-
interest.33  Fear of punishment is thought to be the principal motivator of
behavior, with individuals deciding whether to act only after weighing the
potential gain from wrongdoing against the possibilities of detection and
sanction.34  If detection risks are low and personal gain from malfeasance
is high, we should expect rational actors to commit a wrong.  By contrast,
29. See Robert Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59
(2010); J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications and
Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012); Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit
Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization? 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591 (2011);
Yockey, supra note 16.
30. See Larry E. Ribstein, Agents Prosecuting Agents 5 (Ill. Program in Law, Behavior
and Soc. Sci., Research Paper No. LBSS11-01, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1737915 (citing Adam Smith and his Wealth of Nations: “Being the
managers of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they
should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which partners in a private
copartnery frequently watch over their own.”).
31. See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 72 (2002).
32. JONATHON JACKSON ET AL., Compliance and Legal Authority, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (2d ed., forthcoming 2015); Gary
S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 190–93
(1968).
33. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 32.
34. Id.
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if the likelihood of detection is high or the severity of possible sanctions is
great, compliance ought to be more likely.  Strategies for compliance
under this view thus focus on finding the right balance between monitor-
ing and penalties to promote ethical behavior.
The influence of rational choice theory colors many of the compliance
tools found in corporations today.  Whether talking about boards of direc-
tors, reporting lines, codes of conduct, periodic inspections, whistleblower
programs, independent directors, or any number of formal governance
and monitoring structures, the goal is usually the same: to present agents
with a credible risk of detection and punishment.  If employees are caught
failing to obey a firm’s code of conduct, for example, their failure is typi-
cally tied to a range of disciplinary measures up to and including termina-
tion.35  When this possibility is high enough, the expectation is that it will
keep managers, employees, and agents on the straight and narrow.
The same emphasis permeates public enforcement policy.  Congress
has long called for punitive sanctions for most corporate crimes and regu-
latory offenses, and recent legislative efforts to crack down on corporate
crime continue to reflect a command-and-control mindset.36  The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the DOJ’s internal charging policies further en-
courage firms to monitor and detect wrongdoing by factoring these activi-
ties into enforcement and sanctioning decisions.37  Given the prospect of
respondeat superior liability, the hope is that the chance for leniency in
exchange for implementing corporate compliance programs will prompt
firms to closely supervise their employees.38  This approach is also meant
to take some of the surveillance pressure off of external enforcers as firms
receive incentives to police their own workforce—of which they presuma-
bly have more intimate knowledge—and cooperate with prosecutors to
identify individual violators.  Where internal compliance programs fail, ei-
ther because firms lack the power or market incentives to completely con-
trol their agents’ behavior, external enforcers pick up the slack through
strategies that rely less on cooperation and more on traditional means of
investigation.39  Tactics include subpoenas, wiretaps, industry-wide surveil-
35. See Gary R. Weaver, Encouraging Ethics in Organizations: A Review of Some Key
Research Findings, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 293, 304–07 (2014).
36. Id. at 293 (citing as example the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate reform statute); Tom
Tyler et al., The Ethical Commitment to Compliance: Building Value-Based Cultures, 50 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 31, 31 (2008) (describing command-and-control compliance strategies as em-
phasizing detection of wrongdoing through monitoring and reporting systems, as well as en-
couraging proper behavior through discipline and incentive structures).
37. David Hess et al., The 2004 Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
Their Implicit Call for a Symbiotic Integration of Business Ethics, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 725, 725–26 (2006).
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965) (the legal principle of re-
spondeat superior mandates that a corporation is vicariously liable for an employee’s wrong-
doing, even where the employee violates express instructions or existing compliance
requirements); Hess et al., supra note 37.
39. See Ribstein, supra note 30, at 6–7.
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lance, use of confidential informants, and whistleblower reward
programs.40
Compliance remains a highly nuanced and evolving field.  In addition
to the classic detect-and-punish model, much of the recent focus in compli-
ance theory is on developing methods to instill strong ethical values and
cultures within firms.  The move toward a values-based approach to com-
pliance is critical to compliance in social enterprises, but it is important to
keep in mind that rational choice theory is still very much at the fore of
the conversation.  For instance, while the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
urge firms to promote “an organizational culture that encourages ethical
conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law,” the specific prac-
tices they recommend rely mainly on traditional ideas for detection, moni-
toring, and reporting.41  The DOJ and SEC maintain a similar stance.
They routinely stress the importance of ethical corporate cultures in the
workplace, but most of the compliance features they endorse track a
“don’t get caught” mentality.42
III. LIMITS OF TRADITIONAL COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES
A. General Limitations
The main attraction of compliance programs that are built around ra-
tional actor theory is that they support objective methods and metrics.
Firms and regulators can use fines, settlements, investigations, arrest rates,
indictments, and codes of conduct to provide clear evidence that they are
ferreting out wrongdoing and applying appropriate sanctions.  These mea-
sures also facilitate quick responses to new problems and provide psycho-
logical comfort to people hoping to do something in the face of illegal
behavior.43  For example, command-and-control tactics like police sweeps
and raids make it easier for enforcement authorities to show an anxious
public that they are taking steps to manage crises.44  The same is true
when companies announce new or revised compliance programs in the
wake of scandal: firms get something tangible that they can cite when try-
ing to restore market confidence in their ability to prevent future
problems.  Even more directly, penalties and formal compliance structures
provide agents with a reference point for ordering their conduct.  Agents
know that if they commit X violation then they risk Y consequences.  This
puts a price tag on wrongdoing.
40. See Joseph W. Yockey, FCPA Settlement, Internal Strife, and the “Culture of Com-
pliance”, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 689, 692–96 (2012).
41. See Weaver, supra note 35, at 293 (quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 8B2.1(a) (2012)).
42. See id. at 294–95.
43. See Tom R. Tyler, Reducing Corporate Criminality: the Role of Values, 51 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 267, 280–85 (2014).
44. Id. To illustrate this point, fans of the HBO series The Wire might recall the city-
wide raids and “dope on the table” strategy demanded by the Baltimore Police Commis-
sioner near the end of Season 1.
Fall 2014] The Compliance Case for Social Enterprise 11
Unfortunately, many of the traditional methods of compliance that em-
anate from rational choice theory suffer from significant shortcomings.
The first concern is that questions of lawful behavior are often less clear-
cut than these methods suggest they should be.  Compliance with authority
is a complex phenomenon.  It requires actors to make highly subjective,
context-specific decisions that depend on more than law and economic
theory.  Misbehavior can stem from peer pressure, individual bias, envi-
ronmental factors, and other transient influences that firms and regulators
cannot fully anticipate in the face of ever-present information asymme-
tries.  This is one reason why tools such as codes of conduct and employee
handbooks rarely bolster compliance unless organizations already employ
workers who are predisposed to taking them seriously.45  Recent research
further finds that individuals do not always engage in the type of delibera-
tive processes that rational choice theorists predict.  Many people react to
situations and make moral judgments reflexively without pausing to weigh
the costs and benefits of their actions or the risks of detection.46  Formal
and static tools meant to deter wrongdoing ex ante—including codes of
conduct and statutory sanctions—lose much of their efficacy in this
dynamic.
A second challenge is the likelihood of over- or under-deterrence.
Penalties in a rational choice framework must be set at a level that will be
high enough to discourage people from committing a wrong but not so
severe that they will cause firms to go out of business (in which case inno-
cent employees, creditors, and shareholders could be unduly punished for
the violations of others).47  This is an extremely difficult task for policy-
makers working with incomplete information or personal motives that
conflict with the public’s best interests.48  Even assuming arguendo that
the economic benefits of wrongdoing can be calculated with some degree
of precision (e.g., the amount of ill-gotten financial gains), the costs of
non-economic sanctions are far trickier to judge.  Companies vary with
respect to the reputational harm they will suffer following a corporate in-
dictment or investigation, and this is not something that regulators and
judges always grasp or price accurately.49
If the potential combination of legal and non-legal sanctions becomes
too high, there is a danger that the total cost of enforcement—including
45. See Weaver, supra note 35, at 300–02.
46. See id.; see also Scott J. Reynolds, The Non-Conscious Aspects of Ethical Behavior:
Not Everything in the “Good” Organization is Deliberate and Intentional, 51 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 245, 257–59 (2014).
47. See Christine Parker, The “Compliance” Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive
Regulatory Enforcement, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 591, 591–92 (2006).
48. See Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127
HARV. L. REV. 853, 903–05 (2014).
49. See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775,
1783–84 (2011).
12 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 4:1
compliance costs—will become socially inefficient.50  Firms may monitor
agents too closely, thereby reducing the benefits of delegating power, or
their emphasis on compliance could lead agents to become overly risk
averse.51  The resulting costs will then get passed on to consumers in the
form of higher prices, or to employees in the form of lower wages.52  A
separate difficulty arises because corporate sanctions may be insufficient
to induce managers to take compliance seriously.  Managers might turn a
blind eye to crime if it improves profits, confident in the fact that they will
not bear the full costs of any fines levied against their employer (a non-
human legal entity).53
Finally, many business offenses, including bribery and embezzlement,
take place in secret, with offenders going to great pains to cover their
tracks.  These circumstances already present a low probability of detec-
tion, but the growing size and complexity of modern corporate offices and
transactions makes matters worse.54  A parallel danger is that regulators’
willingness to credit strong internal compliance programs may lead firms
to focus on structures that simply check the minimum number of boxes
that government agencies demand—regardless of whether they have the
means or expertise to implement them effectively.55  Showing leniency to
firms that hand over individual wrongdoers can also backfire.  Even if an
employee is correctly held responsible, other agents could see external co-
operation as an attempt to save higher-ranked officers from taking the
blame.  This threatens to create an almost adversarial relationship be-
tween employees and management, potentially contributing to internal
strife and breakdowns in communication as people within the firm wonder
whose side their superiors are on.56
B. Specific Issues for Social Enterprises
1. Normative Considerations
Social enterprises are not immune from the foregoing issues and raise
several more of their own.  The most immediate concern stems from the
50. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Sanctions, 6 COMPETITION
POL’Y INT’L 3, 5 (2010).
51. See Ribstein, supra note 30, at 5.
52. See id.
53. See Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 50, at 17.
54. See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613,
1625 (2007) (discussing how private organizations are relatively opaque and larger firms with
hierarchical layers present even greater challenges).
55. See Joseph W. Yockey, Choosing Governance in the FCPA Reform Debate, 38 J.
CORP. L. 325, 328 (2013); Hess et al., supra note 37, at 731–32 (arguing that corporations are
not being encouraged to develop new solutions to existing (or potential) problems, but only
to meet a certain minimum level of behavior).
56. See John Hasnas, A Context for Evaluating Department of Justice Policy on the
Prosecution of Business Organizations: Is the Department of Justice Playing in the Right
Ballpark?, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 7, 26 (2014); see also Yockey, supra note 40, at 715.
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realization that traditional compliance theory reflects a conception of the
firm rooted in shareholder primacy theory.  Starting with Berle and Means
in 1932, the normative underpinnings of the shareholder primacy theory
stretch back to the basics in corporate literature by focusing on the poten-
tial divergence of interests between managers and shareholders.57  The
risk of this divergence in manager-shareholder relations is the classic prin-
cipal-agent problem.  Because corporate managers control money that is
not their own, they can act opportunistically to maximize their own self-
interests (e.g., income, status, pleasure, a comfortable office) in ways that
do not match the interests of shareholders (presumed under this view to
be profits).58
The consequence of this understanding of the firm is that systems must
be created so shareholders can monitor management to ensure that their
interests are properly aligned.59  The classic compliance strategies men-
tioned above reflect this position.  These strategies essentially seek to an-
swer the question of “how investors get the managers to give them back
their money.”60  As a result, the board of directors is traditionally under-
stood as a monitoring body elected by shareholders to prevent actions that
hinder shareholder wealth maximization.61  Audited balance sheets and
the mandatory disclosure regime of the federal securities laws are meant
to provide investors with sufficient information to protect their financial
interests.  Investor protection is also the mandate of the SEC’s Division of
Enforcement, and the DOJ’s corporate charging guidelines begin by stat-
ing that prosecutors and corporate directors share the same goal of pro-
tecting the firm’s owners, shareholders, from the effects of criminal
misconduct.62  Both agencies pursue penalties to deter agents from taking
illegal actions that, for example, increase short-term profits for sharehold-
ers to trigger parallel increases in performance-based compensation.
Social enterprises, too, must be cognizant of monitoring and the need
to mitigate agency costs.  The people who work for them are not transcen-
dently good; they may be admirably drawn to the firm to solve a social ill,
but we cannot infer that their “goodness” extends to every aspect of their
lives.  No, the problem with applying traditional compliance theory is not
that social enterprises present zero risk of misbehavior.  Rather, the prob-
57. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
58. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
59. Id.
60. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.
FIN. 737, 738 (1997).
61. See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, in
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 945, 992–93 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell
eds., 2d Vol. 2007).
62. See Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Compo-
nents & U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28,
2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf.
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lem with traditional compliance theory is its presupposition that share-
holder wealth is the most important interest in every firm, where using
other people’s money to promote social good is often seen as another
agency problem that takes cash from shareholders.63  The social enterprise
is a unique breed of company.  It relies on shareholders for capital and
seeks profits to fund operations, but both strategies are the means to an
end of human flourishing.  Most companies that start out with a social
problem in mind do not first consider the nonprofit form.64  They want to
make money for investors; that is their principal objective.  If they gener-
ate excess cash, then maybe managers can use corporate resources to pro-
tect the environment or donate to charity (although even that freedom is
disputed by strict adherents to shareholder primacy).65  Social enterprises
reverse this equation.  They make money to do good.  In prior generations
they would have been nonprofits, but they have chosen a new for-profit
model to take advantage of market tactics to escalate their impact.
Managers in a social enterprise must consequently balance the mission
and profit goals of a wide range of constituents, including employees, cus-
tomer-beneficiaries, and investors.66  This understanding has obvious im-
plications for capital formation and accountability,67 but it also indicates a
clear focal point for the development of compliance theory.  Compliance
strategies that emphasize the protection of shareholder wealth above all
else are simply inapposite to the social enterprise’s DNA.  Put another
way, prioritizing mission over shareholder wealth does not necessarily re-
duce to a form of agency costs.  It is what social enterprises are designed to
do and, ideally, is what will allow them to maximize firm value in the long
run.68
63. See Philipp Krueger, Corporate Goodness and Shareholder Wealth, J. FIN. ECON.
(forthcoming 2014); Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the
Corporate Objective Function, 22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 32, 32–33 (2010) (arguing that CSR
activities divert time away from core managerial obligations).
64. Bright B. Simons, What Makes Social Entrepreneurs Different, HARV. BUS. REV.
BLOG (Jan. 11, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/01/what-makes-social-entrepreneur/
(“Commercial entrepreneurs are different. They’re out to standardize a business model. That
model might solve a social problem — but if it’s profitable and doesn’t fix the problem, that’s
okay, too.”).
65. See Friedman, supra note 7, at 122–24; see also David P. Baron, Corporate Social
Responsibility and Social Entrepreneurship, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 683, 683–87
(2007) (describing the debate about whether shareholder primacy norms and theories create
room for corporate philanthropy).
66. Of course, in closely held firms, where managers and shareholders are often the
same people, the agency cost and compliance analysis takes on a different dimension. Re-
maining closely held allows founders to preserve control while minimizing the risk of activism
from other shareholders. Monitoring and information costs are lowest when owners are few
in number, share the same goals, and transact with each other on a regular basis. Consensus
building also becomes easier under these conditions.
67. See Yockey, supra note 16.
68. See Simons, supra note 64; see also Battilana, supra note 14, at 55.
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The implications of this dynamic give credence to Dobell’s observation
that “[p]eople interact differently in different institutional settings, with
their different reward systems or incentive structures.”69  Compliance, like
much of corporate governance, is contextual.  It will vary by type of busi-
ness, type of capital structure, and type of workforce.  If shareholder
wealth maximization is seen as preeminent, then a manager’s take on com-
pliance will focus on serving that objective.  A social enterprise, with its
hybrid purpose of mission and profit, requires a compliance approach that
fits its distinct normative premise.  Any compliance strategy that managers
put into place must deter individual wrongdoing while simultaneously
reinforcing the firm’s two bottom lines.  Compliance becomes about bal-
ancing mission and profits, even if that means taking steps to elevate third
party effects ahead of shareholder interests.
To illustrate the potential challenge that this orientation presents, con-
sider a hypothetical involving foreign bribery.  The developing world is
often where social enterprises can do the most good, but, sadly, the devel-
oping world is also where corruption tends to be the most prevalent.70
Can a social enterprise do business in a country where nearly every public
official requests bribes?  The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
prohibits firms from paying bribes to foreign officials for the purpose of
getting business.71  Firms that violate the statute face stiff monetary sanc-
tions.72  However, in the rational actor/shareholder primacy tradition of
compliance, if the risk of detection is low and the potential gains from a
corrupt transaction are high, managers might be tempted to go ahead and
make a payoff to increase shareholder profits.  One might also assume that
investors might evaluate issues like corruption based on how likely they
are to increase the value of their shares.73  If bribery is profitable to the
company, who are they to stop it?
For social enterprises, though, since shareholder wealth is not their ex-
clusive aim, the question of whether to bribe is not just a matter of weigh-
ing detection probabilities and potential profits.  Managers must also
anticipate, assess, and work through how the ancillary effects of corrup-
69. Rachel Culley & Jill R. Horwitz, Profits v. Purpose: Hybrid Companies and the
Charitable Dollar, 2 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No.
272, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2055368 (quoting
Professor Rob Dobell).
70. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, http://
www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results (last visited Oct. 22, 2014) (indicating that developing
countries such as Somalia, North Korea, and Afghanistan are perceived as being among the
most corrupt countries in the world).
71. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1–3) (2012).
72. See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 907
(2010); Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly
Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 498 (2011); Joseph W.
Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 781, 782–83 (2011).
73. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1193, 1228–29 (1985).
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tion—including market distortion, erosion of the rule of law, and negative
effects on morale—will influence their pursuit of mission and their in-
tended beneficiaries.74  For instance, because shareholders in a social en-
terprise seek both financial and social returns, they often view themselves
as quasi-donors.75  To them, learning that the firm paid a bribe could be
more off-putting than the failure to hit earnings estimates.  The same is
true for a social enterprise’s employees and customers, both of whom are
often drawn to the social enterprise model principally because of its prom-
ise of shared value.  It follows that social enterprises need a compliance
theory that comprehends the broader interests and perspectives that ac-
company their hybrid identity.
2. Additional Practical and Political Considerations
Two final points also deserve mention.  The first is that many founders
of social enterprises come from backgrounds other than business and have
no experience running one.76  They are often highly idealistic but lack the
knowledge and skills necessary to anticipate or respond to new compliance
challenges.77  Even wholly scrupulous and well-meaning people can get
themselves into trouble if they do not understand the importance of estab-
lishing and adhering to basic internal controls.78  A particular worry is that
socially oriented employees will be more susceptible to fraud.  Social en-
terprises must guard against the risk that agents will see everything
74. Bright Simons describes this observation nicely:
[S]ocial entrepreneurs are more interested in understanding the social, economic, politi-
cal, and cultural context of the problems they are trying to solve than traditional entre-
preneurs are. They can be more analytical. It is unthinkable, for instance, to imagine a
social entrepreneur treating research on the health effects of tobacco use the way the
tobacco industry, market analysts, and investors did in the 1960s and ‘70s. It is the busi-
ness of a social entrepreneur to stay ahead of the curve when it comes to the social
impact of various phenomena, and to be academically honest about what they learn.
Simons, supra note 64.
75. See, e.g., Steven Russolillo, Man Who Bet It All on Tesla Answers Critics, WALL
ST. J. (May 20, 2013, 11:55 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/05/20/the-man-who-
bet-it-all-on-tesla-answers-his-critics/; John Tozzi, More ‘Patient Capital’ for Social Ventures,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 3, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2009-04-
03/more-patient-capital-for-social-venturesbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-fi
nancial-advice.
76. See Andreas Heinecke et al., Leadership in Social Enterprise: How to Manage
Yourself and the Team, SCHWAB FOUND. FOR SOC. ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 7–8 (2014), available
at http://www.schwabfound.org/sites/default/files/file_uploads/leadership_in_social_enterpris
e_2014.pdf.
77. See generally James Austin et al., Social and Commercial Entrepreneurship: Same,
Different, or Both?, 30 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 1, 11 (2006); Alan Hirzel, To
Grow, Social Enterprises Must Play by Business Rules, HARV. BUS. REV. BLOG (Jan. 9, 2013,
2:07 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/01/to-grow-social-enterprises-mus/.
78. See Ben DiPietro, Nonprofits Face Up to More Compliance, WALL ST. J. BLOG
(May 17, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/05/17/nonprofits-face-
up-to-tighter-compliance/.
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through rose-tinted glasses, or that they will falsely assume everyone with
whom they interact shares their concern for the firm’s mission.79
A second issue is that many social enterprises are small startups, and
smaller and medium-sized firms often have fewer capital resources to
spend on professional advisors and fewer employees to implement the rec-
ommendations they make.80  They are frequently self-funded, relying on a
mixture of personal cash, credit cards, bank loans, and small investments
from friends and family.81  These financing options may be enough to get a
business off the ground, but they are often inadequate to cover compliance
and professional costs down the road as operations expand.82
This latter point goes to a larger political issue.  There is nearly univer-
sal agreement on the value of fostering the social enterprise sector.  On
the right, many find supporting social enterprises more attractive than ad-
ditional public involvement with social causes.83  Observers on the left ar-
gue that the government is failing to adequately address various social
problems, and they view social enterprises as helpful gap-fillers.84  The
strong, unified push to encourage social enterprise makes it important to
develop a compliance theory that positively affects the movement’s
growth and impact.  In addition to the good that social enterprises perform
through their products and services, some argue that social enterprises of-
fer significant potential for inspiring new job creation in developing coun-
tries.85  Others believe that social enterprises can restore faith in political
and economic systems currently under siege.86  If these estimations are
even slightly on target, then that is enough to make social enterprises wor-
thy of attention.  Governments and charities cannot solve every public
welfare problem.  The private sector also has an essential role to play.
79. Id.
80. See Jakob Svensson, Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross
Section of Firms, 118 Q. J. ECON. 207, 207 (2003). Companies and individuals with less “re-
fusal power” also tend to face a higher frequency of bribe demands as corrupt public officials
come to recognize that they have fewer alternative options available. Id. at 218.
81. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1406, 1417 (2008).
82. Even if some market risks might be fairly easy to calculate (e.g., fluctuations in
supply costs), risks like bribery demands or potential legal actions are considerably less
quantifiable.
83. See Yockey, supra note 16, at 14.
84. Id.
85. See Richard McEachran, The Difficulty of Starting Up a Social Enterprise in a
Warzone, GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2013, 2:59 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/social-enter
prise-network/2013/aug/16/social-enterprises-in-warzone.
86. See id.
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IV. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AND THE SHIFT TO
VALUES-BASED COMPLIANCE
Concerns about classic compliance theory, both generally and in the
specific context of social enterprises, compel a search for new ideas.  The
alternative with the most traction is frequently described as values-based
compliance.  Under this approach, rather than emphasizing risks of detec-
tion and sanction, the focus is on developing an internal culture that en-
courages agents to identify and internalize a desired set of values, ideals,
and practices.87  The expectation is that strategies grounded in sociology
and psychology will lead agents to see compliance as congruent with their
own beliefs.88  Compliance then becomes more reflexive as agents come to
see it as an organic extension of their own identity and the organization’s
purpose, rather than something forced upon them by an isolated and dis-
connected (and perhaps misinformed) external authority.89
This approach parallels the trend in sports medicine of training move-
ment, not muscles.90  The idea is simple.  Conventional thinking in athletic
training previously emphasized the exercise of muscles in isolation.91  Dur-
ing the offseason, a professional football player might devote considerable
time to working his biceps on an arm curl machine before moving to an-
other part of the gym to strengthen his quadriceps on a leg extension ma-
chine.  The benefit of this model is that the athlete’s biceps and quadriceps
gain strength and bulk; he can then lift more weight and push off the
ground more powerfully.  But the problem with this approach, and the
reason it is now passé, is that an athlete’s muscles never work in isolation
on the playing field.92  A quarterback who drops back for a pass exerts
force on multiple parts of his body at once.  On just his knee, there will be
a combination of lateral, circular, and vertical forces—with each force ac-
celerating or decreasing to varying degrees on each play.  The philosophy
of training movement rather than muscles takes this observation as the
basis for educating the body to move most efficiently and effectively in
accord with how it moves in a specific discipline.  Thus, training programs
occur in a movement-based context and correspond to the motions that
arise during sport.  For the quarterback, that means training his body in
ways that will lead him to unconsciously endure and react to the forces
converging on his knee as he twists and turns to avoid tacklers.
87. Weaver, supra note 35, at 295–96; see also Tyler, supra note 43, at 283–85.
88. Weaver, supra note 35, at 295–96; see also Tyler, supra note 43, at 268–77.
89. See Hess et al., supra note 37, at 763–64.
90. See Gretchen Reynolds, Train Like a German Soccer Star, N.Y. TIMES (July 16,
2014, 12:01 AM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/train-like-a-german-soccer-star/
?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
91. See DUNCAN MACDOUGALL & DIGBY SALE, THE PHYSIOLOGY OF TRAINING FOR
HIGH PERFORMANCE 281–82 (2014); see also Exos, Train Movement, Not Muscles (Dec. 20,
2008), http://www.coreperformance.com/daily/movement/train-movements-not-muscles.html.
92. See Reynolds, supra note 90.
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Values-based compliance attempts to do something similar in corpo-
rate governance.  It encourages a multi-dimensional approach to address-
ing ethical issues as they arise.  It seeks to minimize the chance that agents
will zero in on just one goal (i.e., profits), educating them instead to intui-
tively consider every organizational priority when approaching any situa-
tion.  The ultimate goal is that agents come to behave responsibly and in
the ways the organization prefers because they believe it is natural and
legitimate to do so—not because they are afraid of being caught.93
Reaching the stage where agents internalize values in this way is not
always easy.  It may require changes in management, training, messaging,
hiring, corporate governance, and, in some cases, even interior design.94
But there are many potential upsides.  Traditional command-and-control
strategies are static, require considerable investment in surveillance, and
typically come only in reaction to an ever-changing set of new or short-
term problems.  They depend on the nearly impossible task of accurately
pricing misconduct ex ante, and they falsely assume that agents act only
after taking time to reflect.  In contrast, compliance driven by values is
cheaper, teaches agents to adapt instinctively and proactively to changing
or ambiguous conditions, and does not rely solely on problematic cost-
benefit analyses.  It is also more sustainable over the long-term given its
emphasis on systemic change rather than reactive, one-off fixes to isolated
problems.  These characteristics are attractive to every firm, but there is
arguably no greater vehicle for testing their promise than the social
enterprise.
A. Integration of Purpose
1. The Challenge
The first stage in cultivating values-based compliance is to conceptual-
ize the goals and ideals that a firm wishes to champion.  Doing so provides
a framework for assessing whether a firm’s values align with those of its
agents, and vice versa.  Contrary to popular belief, the controllers of tradi-
tional firms do not always emphasize maximizing shareholder profits at all
costs.  From a purely practical perspective, most managers understand that
corporate performance depends on balancing the interests of a wide range
93. See Tyler, supra note 43, at 268–77. This argument should not be taken to mean
that deterrence and sanctions are irrelevant. As Tyler notes, “[w]e do not know how much
illegal behavior would occur if companies believed that they could commit fraud or engage in
other forms of illegal behavior with no risk of being caught and punished.” Id. at 270. The
point is simply that culture is a very important piece—if not the most important—of the
overall compliance puzzle.
94. See Weaver, supra note 35, at 296 (describing one company that eliminated sepa-
rate executive dining facilities to support a culture of mutual respect and responsibility) (cit-
ing LINDA KLEBE TREVINO & GARY R. WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS IN BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES 193 (Stanford Business Books, 1st ed.
2003)).
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of stakeholders.95  Illegality or the poor treatment of employees, creditors,
suppliers, and local communities can lead to adverse public relations, labor
unrest, declining sales, greater regulatory scrutiny, and, ultimately, loss of
share value.96  There is also increasing market demand for products and
investment opportunities that promote social responsibility,97 and many
firms now find that sustainability initiatives lower energy and utility
costs.98  These developments, coupled with the broad decision-making
protection of the business judgment rule, encourage managers to sponsor
virtually any socially- or stakeholder-oriented objective that they deem
necessary to serve the firm’s best interests.
The situation gets more complex when we shift to how values are
spread and understood within the firm.  As a threshold matter, corporate
purpose dictates the development of structures and processes meant to
advance it.99  The simpler and more direct the corporate purpose, the eas-
ier it becomes to integrate it into corporate governance activities.100  Thus,
if shareholder wealth maximization is a firm’s singular purpose, the aim of
corporate governance will be to achieve that end at the exclusion of other
values.101  One of the challenges in incorporating stakeholder and sus-
tainability concerns into firm governance, then, is the temptation to com-
partmentalize them—to view them as important but still separate from
financial considerations.  This is a variation of the “two- masters” argu-
ment that arises in almost every debate about the responsibilities of corpo-
rate managers.102  As managers move beyond a narrow view of
shareholder primacy to weigh additional factors, there is a danger that
they will perceive a lack of any objective, leading to what Jensen describes
as “confusion and a lack of purpose.”103  They may feel bound to make
95. See Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1433–34 (2006).
96. See id.; Derek Bok, Comment on “The Business of Business Schools” (by Robert
Simons), 8 CAP. & SOC., no. 1, 2013, at 3.
97. See Henderson & Malani, supra note 12, at 582–85.
98. See, e.g., More Wind Energy Means Lower Electricity Prices, SUSTAINABLEBUSI-
NESS.COM (Feb. 13, 2014, 3:38 PM), http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/
news.display/id/25517.
99. See Lyman Johnson et al., Rethinking How Business Purpose is Taught in Catholic
Business Education, 32 J. CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUC. 59, 61 n.4 (2013); see, e.g., Lyman P. Q.
Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Pur-
pose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 434–35 (2013).
100. See Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 277
(1988).
101. Cf. Johnson et al., supra note 99, at 61 n.4 (asserting that the focus of a corpora-
tion’s activity will change as its purpose changes, and that if a corporation’s purpose is to
maximize shareholder wealth, it will seek means to achieve that end).
102. See generally Ronald J. Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 3 (2012) (discussing the importance of making corporate officers focus not only on the
bottom line financials, but also on noneconomic values).
103. Jensen, supra note 63, at 34. But see Robert Phillips et al., What Stakeholder The-
ory Is Not, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 479, 481 (2003) (arguing among other things, that “[m]anaging
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trade-offs between social and financial goals, or between different corpo-
rate constituencies.
For example, much of the discussion surrounding corporate social re-
sponsibility focuses on whether an emphasis on non-shareholder interests
will increase or decrease firm value.104  There is less consideration of
whether this practice is wise apart from its impact on the bottom line, or if
it can be integrated throughout all facets of business strategy.105  The re-
sult is often that corporate philanthropic activity becomes disconnected
from ordinary operations, handled by separate staff, or maintained
through the creation of a separate legal entity.106  Something similar hap-
pens in the context of stakeholder governance.  Proponents of stakeholder
governance often ask which of the various competing stakeholders should
receive the most consideration—that is, to whom managers should be
most accountable—instead of asking how they can inspire stakeholders to
work together constructively toward a common purpose.107  The primary
question among stakeholders typically “remains ‘do I have mine,’ rather
than evincing a genuine concern for the corporation’s mission and com-
mon good.”108
The tendency to see social, stakeholder, and financial objectives as re-
lated-but-separate raises several issues for value-setting.  Should a firm
support non-shareholder constituents only when financially attractive, or
should it commit to doing so out of a larger sense of ethical obligation?
Whatever path the firm chooses will influence how internal and external
actors perceive the company’s values.  A firm that markets itself as
“green” but relies solely on greenwashing tactics sends employees a decid-
edly mixed message about the importance of environmental sus-
tainability.109  Similarly, promoting environmental concerns only up to the
for stakeholders involves attention to more than simply maximizing shareholder
wealth . . . .”).
104. See Phillips et al., supra note 103, at 481 (“[F]or stakeholder theory, attention to
the interests and well-being of some non-shareholders is obligatory for more than the pru-
dential and instrumental purposes of wealth maximization of equity shareholders.”).
105. See Ioannis Ioannou, Redefining Strategy in the Age of Sustainability and Social
Responsibility (Draft 2014) (on file with author) (“[T]o the extent that stakeholder theory is
associated with the stream of work that has empirically explored corporate social perform-
ance (CSP) . . . it has paradoxically suffered from Edward Freeman’s separation fallacy: the
strand of literature on CSP tends to conceptualize social and financial performance as inde-
pendent and distinct constructs (e.g., exploring whether CSP is an antecedent to financial
performance and vice versa), thus failing to address the broader sustainability issues in an
integrated and holistic manner.”).
106. See Reiser, supra note 1, at 2450 (discussing how Google.org was formed as a for-
profit subsidiary of Google, Inc. to work alongside the nonprofit Google Foundation to pur-
sue charitable activities).
107. See Colombo, supra note 102, at 74–76.
108. Johnson et al., supra note 99, at 71–72.
109. The term “greenwashing” refers to marketing practices that are meant to deceive
consumers into believing that a company is operating in an environmentally friendly way. See
Eric L. Lane, Greenwashing 2.0, 38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 279, 280–81 (2013).
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point of clear profitability threatens to color the judgment of managers
and employees whenever those factors come into tension.  Agents may
rate profitability higher than ethical or social considerations since the for-
mer lends itself to objectivity and provides a simpler baseline for measur-
ing success—and that is even assuming they accept the premise of socially
conscious business practice at all.  Agents might also tend to drift toward
actions that are clearly legally defensible under current law given that do-
ing so is often easier than running decisions through a loose program of
social responsibility.110  In sum, even entirely well-meaning corporate con-
trollers risk fragmenting their agents’ sense of values if they take a patch-
work approach to how or when shareholder and non-shareholder interests
should be taken into account.
2. The Solution
The social enterprise offers a way around these concerns by focusing
on a mission-centric purpose at inception.  At its fifteenth century roots,
the word “corporation” referred to “associations of individuals united for
a special purpose.”111  The social enterprise is arguably the best embodi-
ment of this etymology.  It is an organization of persons who take collec-
tive action to pursue the common goal of public benefit.  It draws
inspiration from the progress being made toward stakeholder governance
and then goes beyond it to offer a more comprehensive vision of corporate
purpose.  Profits remain necessary to sustain the firm’s mission, but social
enterprises pursue profits and mission reciprocally, shaping their strategies
to reflect a synergistic relationship between the two.112  This does not
mean that decisions in a social enterprise are easier than those in tradi-
tional CSR-practicing firms, but it should give agents more precise direc-
tion for aligning their conduct toward the same overarching goal.
The golf swing provides a useful analogy.  For a golf swing to function
properly, meaning that the golf ball follows its optimal trajectory upon
impact, a player must develop the proper mechanics.  The player’s shoul-
ders, hips, legs, and hands must work in harmony to set the golf club on a
parabolic swing plane that corresponds to the target line.  If any individual
aspect of the swing sequence falls out of position—e.g., the left arm buck-
les on the downswing—the shot will stray and the player’s score will suf-
fer.  In theory, the social enterprise’s prevailing dual purpose will keep
agents’ values on the proper plane; that is, in alignment with the firm’s
desired objective.
In contrast, when a purportedly socially conscious firm sends agents
mixed (or conflicting) information about what it values through its mar-
keting, governance, or sourcing practices, the risk increases that individual
110. See Bies, supra note 13, at 227.
111. Meese & Oman, supra note 6, at 287–88 (quoting Pembina Consol. Silver Mining
& Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888)).
112. See Reiser, supra note 1.
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agents will diverge from those values in ways that put the firm’s social
agenda off-track.  Hence, if a breakfast cereal manufacturer limits its envi-
ronmental commitment to using natural ingredients, its agents will not
necessarily discern the value of sustainability and charity in other facets of
corporate activity.  A social enterprise that organizes solely to hire hard-
to-employ individuals or provide affordable clean energy should not face
the same issue.  It offers a tighter social lens through which to filter deci-
sions.  The promotion of a distinct value is the firm’s explicit organiza-
tional purpose, and everything it does is to be done with that purpose in
mind.113  Competing stakeholder interests naturally come into play in this
model and must be balanced—including those of shareholders—but rather
than simply fighting over which stakeholder gets the biggest piece of the
pie, managers can situate stakeholder interests and resolve conflicts within
what Johnson, Naughton, and Bojan call a “framework of a coherent vi-
sion of the common good.”114  This should diminish the chances of inter-
nal discord and variance that might come when firms with less integration
of purpose departmentalize their social and economic values.
B. Culture
With an understanding of the social enterprise’s distinct integration of
purpose at hand, the next step in promoting values-based compliance is
developing a corporate culture that reinforces that purpose and the values
it embodies.  But what is corporate culture?  Humans have long under-
stood that one typically places at the center of her life whatever she
treasures the most.  For example, in medieval urban planning, houses of
worship were often built in the middle of town.115  Religion was a chief
feature in daily life.  Emblematically and practically, its importance was
made manifest by putting churches at the physical heart of local activities
and within easy reach of constituents.  The meaning of culture has its ori-
gins in two Latin words that came to reflect this understanding: cultus
(worship) and cultura (to cultivate).116  Over time, these words fused into
the term “culture” to describe the beliefs, values, and social norms that are
113. The founder of Plum Organics describes this point as follows: “When [social enter-
prise] ideas become inscribed in your corporate bylaws [as part of being a benefit corpora-
tion], it becomes the compass of the company.” Ariel Schwartz, Inside Plum Organics, The
First Benefit Corporation Owned by a Public Company, FAST COMPANY (Jan. 22, 2014, 8:08
AM), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3024991/world-changing-ideas/inside-plum-organics-the-
first-benefit-corporation-owned-by-a-public-co.
114. See Johnson et al., supra note 99, at 77 (quoting Pope John Paul II, Centesimus
annus (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1991), 47).
115. See generally Keith D. Lilley, Cities of God? Medieval Urban Forms and Their
Christian Symbolism, 29 TRANSACTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF BRITISH GEOGRAPHERS 296,
300 (2004) (discussing the Christian symbolism of urban cities in the medieval period).
116. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2013).
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ubiquitous among and fostered by a specific ethnic, religious, or social
group.117
Culture in the corporate setting is consistent with this account. Weaver
describes it as the “formal and informal practices, positions, and routines
that collectively influence employees’ behavior.”118  Colombo adds that it
is the “vehicle for imparting and maintaining the moral principles and the
values, good and bad, that animate life in the organization.”119  Put more
casually by Reynolds, corporate culture is “the way we do things around
here.”120  These descriptions underscore the fact that each firm features a
unique ecology shaped by its history, its mottos, the personalities of its
controllers, its formal governance structures (e.g., organizational charts
and internal policies), and its informal rituals (e.g., employees eating to-
gether every Tuesday).121  They also have significant implications for com-
pliance.  The growth of the professional compliance industry means that
almost every firm instructs its employees in training sessions and policy
handbooks to abide by company rules and obey the law.  Yet, managers
have long understood that formal efforts will fall short if they do not oper-
ate within an internal environment of ethics and lawfulness.
The social enterprise offers a uniquely promising model for shaping a
compliant culture in line with the goal of mission-plus-profits.  Everything
starts with integration of purpose.  Like the medieval town, agents take
their cultural cues and expectations from the values that firms place at
their organizational centers.  The clearer and more important those values
become, the better the chance the members of the firm’s community will
contemplate and internalize them.122  They will come to shape the firm’s
collective identity and create shared understandings among firm members.
This, in turn, ought to motivate character development and activities that
are consistent with them.123  The social enterprise’s de-emphasis on share-
holder primacy is particularly important in this regard.  Organizations that
promote shareholder wealth above all else can expect their cultures to for-
tify that viewpoint through values such as competitiveness or risk-tak-
ing.124  These are not always bad qualities to have, and they can be quite
important to economic success, but agents who perceive that management
117. See Amir N. Licht, Culture and Law in Corporate Governance (Chapter of Oxford
Handbook of Corp. Law and Governance, Working Paper No. 247, 2014).
118. See Weaver, supra note 35, at 302–03.
119. Colombo, supra note 102, at 69 (quoting Edwin M. Hartman, ORGANIZATIONAL
ETHICS AND THE GOOD LIFE 85 (1996)).
120. Reynolds, supra note 46, at 260.
121. See id.
122. See Colombo, supra note 102.
123. See Weaver, supra note 35, at 295.
124. See Renee B. Adams et al., Shareholders and Stakeholders: How Do Directors De-
cide?, 32 STRAT. MGMT. J. 1331, 1332–33 (2011).
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is self-interested and driven primarily by the pursuit of financial gain show
greater tendency to misbehave.125
For example, when performance and compensation are tied principally
to corporate financial gain, as they are in many traditional firms, agents
face a strong incentive to rationalize whatever action is necessary to in-
crease profits—even if it involves doing something that might strike them
as illegal or unethical under different circumstances.126  The same is true
when it comes to other potential influences.  The norm of shareholder pri-
macy that still permeates much of corporate America means that officers
who act responsibly—in ways that lower profits—often find themselves on
the outs with members of their peer group.127  Over time, this climate in-
creases the likelihood that agents will be socialized in ways that cause
them to abandon values that they previously held dear.128  It is plausible
that profit maximization will then become the fallback tiebreaker when-
ever managers or directors face a choice between different courses of ac-
tion.  This might explain why so many corporate leaders continue to show
lapses in moral and ethical judgment.129
On the flip side, organizational policies and practices that routinely
emphasize attention to stakeholder concerns are found to reduce miscon-
duct by eliciting a culture where there is less temptation to cheat or hide
information.130  In this respect, the benefit of the social enterprise is that it
goes further than other companies that profess a general interest in social
responsibility or stakeholder governance.  By honing in on a specific mind-
set of social mission at the top of their organizational hierarchy, social
enterprises are capable of demonstrating more authenticity and legitimacy
in their objectives—in contrast to firms that promote multiple and poten-
tially conflicting values.  Authenticity and legitimacy play a powerful role
in shaping internal firm behavior.131  Managers who demonstrate an au-
thentic interest in prioritizing and safeguarding mission over profits can
expect to stimulate the same behavior in their employees.132  Put simply,
the higher that mission goes on management’s list of priorities, the more
125. See Licht, supra note 117, at 26–27; Reynolds, supra note 46, at 259; Weaver, supra
note 35, at 302.
126. See Colombo, supra note 102, at 67–70.
127. Id. at 53. (“What (outside the corporation) might count as ‘character’ tends to be
more of an obstacle than a boon to corporate success for many people.”) (quoting Robert C.
Solomon, Victims of Circumstances? A Defense of Virtue Ethics in Business, 13 BUS. ETHICS
Q. 43, 44 (2003)).
128. Id. at 53–54. (“Structural factors also work to separate a corporate officer from his
or her personal moral compass. The multiple levels of authority—from shareholders, to di-
rectors, to officers, to other employees—engender confusion over the question of ultimate
moral responsibility for corporate decision making. This evokes both the chilling Nuremburg
refrain of ‘just following orders’ . . . .”).
129. See Johnson et al., supra note 99, at 81.
130. See Weaver, supra note 35, at 300–01.
131. Reynolds, supra note 46, at 262–65.
132. See id.; Tyler, supra note 43.
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likely it will influence how agents interpret and process specific ethical
situations.  Problems come when firms drift from their commitment to par-
ticular values, sowing seeds of uncertainty about the priorities that agents
should focus on as they attempt to resolve ethical dilemmas.
It is imperative not to state too strong a claim.  The above is not meant
to suggest that social enterprises become utopias of compliance and good
behavior simply by virtue of their organizational mandate.  Much depends
on the character of ownership and management, as well as strategies for
hiring and governance.  Social enterprises also cannot be completely self-
less; indeed, if they forgo the pursuit of profits they will not be in business
for long.  Yet everything about a social enterprise is pointed toward solv-
ing a market failure or fixing a previously ignored social problem.  This
baseline portends a professional environment where the people who com-
mit to it can find the support, identity, and sense of place necessary to
sustain it.133
Scholars who identify with the virtue ethics tradition get closest to the
mark when describing the qualities of the “excellent” or “virtuous” com-
pany.134  They understand that corporate culture explains many of the ac-
tions taken by employees, both positive and negative.  More pointedly,
though, they maintain that positive virtue within a firm’s culture correlates
with the idea that success is measured by factors other than money—in-
cluding the well-being of others, the quality of goods produced, and the
sense of dignity and accomplishment that one feels in being a part of the
organization.135  These are qualities that many people are intrinsically
drawn to and will seek to perpetuate when afforded the opportunity.
Profits still matter, but firms risk unethical conduct and workplace dissatis-
faction when they allow them to subvert attention away from other val-
ues.136  Colombo summarizes this view well:
[A] major step toward creating a corporate environment more hospitable to
virtue would be to invert the means-end relationship between product and
profit. The production of a product . . . should not be viewed as a means to the
end of profits, but rather profits should be viewed as a means to the end of
production.137
133. See Hess et al., supra note 37; Tyler, supra note 43.
134. See Colombo, supra note 102, at 72–77.
135. See id. at 72–73.
136. See id. at 70–73 (“Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Centesimus Annus articulated this
position quite well, and it is worth quoting from at some length: ‘When a firm makes a profit,
this means that productive factors have been properly employed and corresponding human
needs have been duly satisfied. But profitability is not the only indicator of a firm’s condition.
It is possible for the financial accounts to be in order, and yet for the people—who make up
the firm’s most valuable asset—to be humiliated and their dignity offended. Besides being
morally inadmissible, this will eventually have negative repercussions on the firm’s economic
efficiency.’”) (quoting JOHN PAUL II, ON THE HUNDRETH ANNIVERSARY OF RERUM
NOVARUM: CENTESIMUS ANNUS 68–69 (1991)).
137. Id. at 72.
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The social enterprise attempts to do precisely that.  In fact, that is the
social enterprise in its purest form.138
C. Power of Form
1. New Standard Form Options
A final component of social enterprise theory that ought to energize a
compliant and ethical corporate culture is the function of legal form.  As
mentioned above, the spread and influence of social enterprise has given
rise to a host of new standard-form business associations.  In just three
years, and with near-unanimous votes in favor, over half of the states en-
acted social enterprise legislation.139  The most popular of the new laws
are those authorizing the Public Benefit Corporation (PBC).140  A few
slight differences aside, PBC statutes require controllers to create a “pub-
lic benefit,” consider stakeholder interests when making decisions, and ad-
here to explicit standards for transparency and accountability.141
138. Battilana et al., supra note 14, at 52 (“In the [social enterprise] ideal, managers do
not face a choice between mission and profit, because these aims are integrated in the same
strategy. More important, the integration of social and commercial value creation enables a
virtuous cycle of profit and reinvestment in the social mission that builds large-scale solutions
to social problems.”).
139. See Yockey, supra note 16.
140. Note the difference between a statutory benefit corporation and a certified B cor-
poration. The latter refers to companies that undergo a process of private certification ad-
ministered by B Lab Company (“B Lab”), a nonprofit organization that seeks to facilitate
social enterprise and social investment. The Non-Profit Behind BCorps, BCORPORATION,
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited
Apr. 22, 2014). B Lab bases its certification on a review of whether a firm adequately uses
“the power of business to solve social and environmental problems.” Id. B Lab also conducts
periodic audits to ensure compliance with its standards. Id. Companies that organize as bene-
fit corporations can also be certified B corporations, but obtaining certification is neither
necessary nor sufficient for statutory compliance. Likewise, a certified B corporation may or
may not be organized as a statutory benefit corporation. Current estimates put the number of
certified B corporations at approximately 1,100, and the total number of benefit corporations
at around 325. BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER, http://benefitcorp.net/find-a-benefit-corp (last
visited Apr. 22, 2014); Interview with J. Haskell Murray, Assistant Professor of Management
and Business Law, Belmont University (Feb. 7, 2014).
141. J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Corpo-
ration Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 201, 211–12 (2014). Some states also feature separate
social enterprise legal provisions that differ from benefit corporation laws. For example, even
though it includes an independent benefit corporation provision, Oregon’s corporate code
also allows firms to include an instruction in their charters that requires managers to conduct
business “in a manner that is environmentally and socially responsible.” OR. REV. STAT.
§ 60.047 (2013). Additionally, California recently authorized the creation of “flexible purpose
corporations” (FPCs). CAL. CORP. CODE § 2600 (2014). FPCs are corporations that (1) ex-
pressly pursue profits and at least one charitable purpose activity, or (2) commit to minimiz-
ing any adverse short- or long-term effects on stakeholders. Id. § 2602. Unlike benefit
corporations, FPCs are not bound to provide a public benefit as assessed against a third-party
standard. See Id. § 14610. Their directors also are not bound to consider any particular corpo-
rate constituents when making decisions. Id. § 2602. The State of Washington also recently
enacted legislation authorizing the creation of a “social purpose corporation,” defined as a
firm in which directors may consider social purposes in addition to profits “as they deem
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Delaware’s statute is a good example of how these requirements fit
together.  Under the law, a PBC must identify in its certificate of incorpo-
ration one or more public benefits that it will pursue.142  “Public benefit”
is defined as a positive effect (or the lessening of negative effects) on per-
sons, entities, communities, or interests, including those of an artistic,
charitable, cultural, educational, literary, medical, religious, scientific, or
technological nature.143  Controllers of a PBC must manage the firm’s af-
fairs in a way that balances shareholders’ financial interests, the interests
of those who are materially affected by the corporation’s activities, and the
pursuit of the specified public benefit(s).144  They must also publish a re-
port every two years that details their efforts to promote the identified
public benefits, and the statute provides a unique shareholder derivative
remedy for use in monitoring social performance.145  The latter two re-
quirements are safeguards meant to ensure that managers will use their
broad discretion to advance the firm’s mission rather than selfish or unre-
lated goals.
2. Why the New Forms Matter
The traditional rationale for the PBC form is that it liberates managers
from the duty to maximize shareholder profits so they can focus on stake-
holder-centric objectives without fear of reprisal.  However, this justifica-
tion is unsatisfactory.146  Existing state corporate law already supplies
managers with sufficient flexibility to depart from norms of shareholder
primacy in virtually every situation.147  But this does not mean that benefit
corporation laws are pointless.  Standard forms can be influential beyond
relevant” but are not required to evaluate the impact of their decisions on any specific list of
firm stakeholders. WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.25.050 (2014).
142. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2013).
143. Id. § 362(b).
144. Id. § 362(a). For discussions of Delaware’s PBC statute, see generally J. William
Callison, Benefit Corporations, Innovation, and Statutory Design, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 143
(2013); Murray, supra note 141.
145. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 366(b), 367. Shareholders meeting a 2% ownership re-
quirement may maintain a derivative suit to enforce the directors’ duties to promote a speci-
fied public benefit. Id. Many other states with benefit-corporation-laws require managers to
provide an assessment of whether their pursuit of a public benefit satisfies an independent
third-party standard that is comprehensive, credible, and recognized for assessing social and
environmental performance. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.750 (2014).
146. Yockey, supra note 16, (manuscript at 20–23); Underberg, supra note 12.
147. See Yockey, supra note 16, (manuscript at 18–19) (describing the broad discretion
that corporate managers enjoy, as well as other legal options for social entrepreneurs (e.g.,
nonprofits, LLCs, closely held firms, etc.)); see also Henderson & Malani, supra note 12, at
573–77 (describing breadth of legal discretion that managers have to make socially oriented
decisions under corporate charity statutes, constituency statutes, and the business judgment
rule judicial framework); Ribstein, supra note 95, at 1470 (arguing that managers enjoy so
much discretion that it will be “only the most unimaginative board that is unable to show
how a ‘reasonable’ use of resources could plausibly enhance the firm’s goodwill.”).
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the provision of default terms.  Most notably, they show an ability to affect
internal behavior in ways germane to the refinement of corporate culture.
This argument has both practical and theoretical dimensions.  On the
practical side, form educates internal and external actors about what they
can expect from firms that adopt it.  For example, recall how the social
enterprise’s integration of purpose and sense of authenticity is significant
for developing a culture infused with matching values.  A social enterprise
that adopts a social-enterprise-specific business form will be even better
positioned to maximize these effects.  Rawhouser et al. note that doing so
“provides a stronger indication that the dual mission of the organization
(written in the organization’s charter) is authentic and can reduce identity
confusion among employees.”148  At the same time, the internalization of
values becomes easier when organizational traits match employees’ per-
sonal beliefs and were significant factors in drawing them to the firm in the
first place.149  Individuals gravitate toward statutes and the values they
represent in light of law’s professed legitimacy.  States that enact subject-
specific laws like PBC statutes thus help to guide behavior ex ante by sig-
naling that certain values are given particularly high importance.150
These points are perhaps easiest to clarify by looking at the alternative.
A firm that does not organize as a formal social-enterprise-specific entity
or which simply professes a general acceptance of CSR principles makes it
harder for outsiders to observe and measure its social commitment.151  If
an employee who highly values the social enterprise ideal joins such a
firm, she may need to bend or compromise her beliefs to fit the firm rather
than slip seamlessly into a formal structure meant to reaffirm them.  She
then becomes more likely to leave for other opportunities.  Even if she
stays, her feelings of disengagement or dissatisfaction could produce a
negative (or at least neutral) effect on the firm’s existing culture.  Highly
visible forms like the PBC offer the market differentiation necessary to
nip such sorting problems in the bud.  They should also discourage defec-
148. See Rawhouser et al., supra note 14.
149. See Gilles Hilary & Kai Wai Hui, Does Religion Matter in Corporate Decision
Making in America?, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 455 (2009) (reviewing literature on this point);
Deborah E. Rupp & Cynthia A. Williams, The Efficacy of Regulation as a Function of Psy-
chological Fit: Reexamining the Hard Law/Soft Law Continuum, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. 581, 585, 588 (2011).
150. See Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Testing the Focal Point Theory of Le-
gal Compliance: The Effect of Third-Party Expression in an Experimental Hawk/Dove Game,
2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 87, 88, 93 (2005) (noting that, by making one result or goal a
focal point, legal rules “guide expectations toward that outcome” and create “self-fulfilling
expectations that [the] outcome will occur.”).
151. Arguably, this concern could be mitigated through social certification programs,
like B Lab’s “B Corp” initiative, but these programs lack the force, influence, expressive
power, and legitimacy of law. See B LAB, http://www.benefitcorp.net/business/become-a-
benefit-corporation (last visited Sept. 29, 2014); Yockey, supra note 16, (manuscript at
24–25).
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tion from the form’s corresponding values since doing so will presumably
be more easily observable within the firm and across the larger sector.152
A similar, but arguably more theoretical, way in which form can influ-
ence corporate culture relates to the expressive power of law.  Laws send
potent signals about societal beliefs that come part and parcel with their
black-letter requirements.153  They help to inculcate individual behaviors
and preferences independently of any separate punitive sanctions.  In this
view, federal air and water pollution statutes suggest that environmental
stewardship is a moral imperative, while the FCPA expresses the view that
bribery is wrong.  By the same token, PBC statutes reinforce the value of
balancing social, stakeholder, and financial concerns in business manage-
ment.  Incorporating as a PBC tattoos this normative framework on the
PBC’s charter and highlights the standards that should inform employee
conduct.
Look no farther than the PBC’s stakeholder governance mandate and
disclosure rules.  Employees who must fulfill these requirements are more
likely to contemplate stakeholder interests and social performance since
doing so is fundamental to their job responsibilities.154  In this way, legal
form validates certain moral values and renounces others.155  It is harder,
for example, to disregard a mission of positive social impact when one is
conditioned by law to provide a narrative account of her progress toward
that goal.  One social entrepreneur puts it like this: “I think it’s more that
now whenever we sort of come across something, we think oh well, we
should or shouldn’t do that because we’re a [benefit corporation]. So I feel
like it is holding us to . . .  do the right thing . . . .”156  A statutory scheme
that encourages employees to develop habits that are consistent with so-
cial values thus makes it easier to instill a culture that prioritizes doing
good.157  At the very least, it becomes cleaner “to get virtue’s ball roll-
ing”—to use Colombo’s phrase—by formally excising the vestiges of a
shareholder primacy norm linked with higher rates of misconduct.158
3. Form and Psychology
Several recent discoveries in social psychology complete this picture.
Compliance research has long focused on conscious thought, with an em-
phasis on behavior that is assumed to come only after deliberate reflec-
152. See Licht, supra note 117 (discussing network effects).
153. Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights After Citizens United: An
Analysis of the Popular Movement to End the Constitutional Personhood of Corporations, 14
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 209, 248–54 (2011).
154. See Yockey, supra note 16, (manuscript at 41).
155. See Colombo, supra note 102, at 70–73.
156. See Stubbs, supra note 15.
157. See id. at 14 (quoting one social entrepreneur as follows: “[Becoming a B Corp]
creates a very strong decision-making, ethical decision-making culture throughout the
business.”).
158. See Colombo, supra note 102, at 28.
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tion.159  However, a growing body of evidence reveals that humans make
decisions both consciously and non-consciously (automatically).160  Some
even maintain that non-conscious mental processes are the most influen-
tial in decision-making.161  Perhaps most noteworthy, though, is the fact
that researchers now show an ability to “prime” non-conscious processes
in ways that directly affect behavior.  Reynolds catalogues numerous stud-
ies where researchers have been able to regulate individuals’ skills and
attitudes through the use of indirect means such as environmental factors,
symbols, and terminology.162  In one case, subjects inundated with con-
cepts tied to being a professor scored better on an intelligence test than
those primed with the traits of a “soccer hooligan.”163  A comparable out-
come occurred when groups of women were primed with stereotypical no-
tions about being less adept at mathematics than men.164  In a final study,
corporate managers with engineering backgrounds were given a survey
asking for their opinions about using bribery to gain business.165  Manag-
ers who received survey materials featuring only symbols of engineering
(e.g., gears and compasses) were far less accepting of bribery than those
given materials containing only economic imagery (e.g., dollar signs and
business charts).166
These results foretell exciting possibilities for legal form and culture.
They offer hope to firms looking to shape instinctual responses in situa-
tions where they lack the time or ability to influence an agent’s process of
deliberation.  Firms adopting social-enterprise-specific forms may now be
able to use their governance structures, slogans, and symbols to play a
measurable role in spreading values that focus less on self-interest and ma-
terial gain, and more on the mission of public service.  By contrast, firms
that talk a good game about compliance and sustainability risk watering
down their messages through symbols and structures that are not in full
alignment with those values.  For example, elements of priming that center
on profit-making and competition may prompt agents to take more legal
or ethical risks than managers prefer, or to focus on personal career ad-
vancement instead of mission.167  Likewise, internal structures that re-
159. Reynolds, supra note 46, at 246–47.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 247–50.
162. Id. at 247–49.
163. Id. at 249.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 254.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 252 (“When organizations are concerned about ethics in their halls, their first
step is typically to specify the ethical standards that their members are to follow. We usually
think of this as a very formal process, but as this research suggests, it is possible for individu-
als to non-consciously set and/or infer the ethical standards of a context. To the extent that
symbols, instructions, activities, or others establish an association to a particular set of nor-
mative expectations (often rooted in stereotypical understandings of institution, occupations,
etc.), individual behavior is more likely to become consistent with those ethical norms. Thus,
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volve around surveillance and the threat of sanctions could impart
counterproductive feelings of distrust and fear if they are not properly cal-
ibrated against other values.168
V. CONSEQUENCES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The normative expectations that social enterprises inspire provide yet
another reminder of the complex interplay between compliance, culture,
and ethics.  Of course, we should not delude ourselves into thinking that
the social enterprise model is a cure-all.  Some self-defined social enter-
prises have failed, and others surely will fail, when it comes to corporate
wrongdoing.169  The point is merely that the social enterprise’s organiza-
tional characteristics show the potential to be better and more consistent
at promoting the values and culture allied with ethical and compliant be-
havior.170  This contention has significant implications for everyone who
interacts with social enterprises.  For example, if the structural and cultural
influences within them make compliance more likely, then that should
lower the risk of external sanctions.  Investors will surely want to consider
this possibility as they assess risk and return, and it will be particularly
attractive to investors looking to support ethical, responsible firms.171
The hope going forward is that others will begin to test this and similar
claims through additional empirical research into the habits and outcomes
within the social enterprise sector.  In the meantime, below are a few sug-
gestions for reform and future practice that follow from the discussion
above.  Many of them would be useful ideas for all companies to explore,
but they acquire a particular edge in the case of social enterprises.
A. Hire the Right People
Compliance begins on the inside.  Legal form and organizational pur-
pose put social enterprises on the right track, but the people within the
firm remain responsible for actually integrating purpose into practice.  The
values inherent in a social enterprise’s workforce thus become vital.  Ac-
cording to Adams, personal values are the “abstract desirable goals that
organizations are able to set ethical standards in more ways than perhaps current understand-
ings suggest.”).
168. Tyler, supra note 43, at 273.
169. See, e.g., Alicia Plerhoples, Whitewashing & the Public Benefit Corporation: An
Example, SOCENTLAW (Jan. 22, 2014), http://socentlaw.com/2014/01/whitewashing-the-public-
benefit-corporation-an-example/ (providing examples of noncompliance).
170. This should not suggest that traditional, non-social enterprises are somehow “bad;”
indeed many do very good work. Rather, my aim is to highlight the grounds for optimism
that follow from the social enterprise’s unique foundation in mission.
171. See generally Colombo, supra note 102, at 84. (“I do not, however, believe that
corporate virtue is a futile hope. Indeed, I conclude with Geoff Moore that virtue-driven
firms are not only possible, but likely to flourish: They would do so because the concentration
on excellence in the practice and not on external goods per se, would, in many cases, actually
improve their performance across a range of parameters rather than diminish it.”) (citations
omitted).
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serve as guiding principles in peoples’ lives.”172  They go beyond goals for
specific situations, becoming one’s moral compass and measuring stick for
legitimacy.173  Empirical evidence confirms that corporate managers of all
stripes draw on their values when making business decisions, even to de-
grees that may contradict legal rules.174
The good news for social enterprises is that their founders often pos-
sess many of the values associated with low incidence of misbehavior.
They are commonly styled as caring, conscientious, and future-oriented—
qualities shown to be strong predictors of ethical leadership.175  Bear in
mind, though, that social entrepreneurs are not completely selfless or
faultless.  Indeed, they are still human, and many desire the comforts and
security that follow from personal wealth.176  But personal wealth cannot
be the sole or even primary motivation of social entrepreneurs.  Founding
a social enterprise generally means foregoing lucrative opportunities with
traditional firms, and the very nature of the work tends to generate lower
revenues because targeted customers are frequently very poor.  When
these factors are coupled with formal structures that prioritize mission and
stakeholder interests, the decreasing emphasis on wealth achievement,
risk, and competition likely minimizes the temptation to commit wrongdo-
ing for personal gain.
Of course, if a social enterprise remains private and closely held, foun-
ders should preserve control and attention-to-mission more easily.  In that
case, there is no divergence of interests between ownership and manage-
ment since they are usually one and the same.  The founders, their fami-
lies, or their hand-picked successors would possess the majority of the
firm’s equity shares (or at least the votes), and thus would have little in-
centive to shift towards maximizing profits and away from mission.  For all
firms, monitoring and information costs are lowest when owners are few in
number, share the same goals, and transact with each other on a regular
basis.177  But not every social enterprise wants to remain small or closely
held.  Many pursue sizable growth and expansion to increase their level of
positive social impact.178  More important, as social enterprises expand,
training, compensation, and hiring take on greater urgency when it comes
to reinforcing organizational values throughout a larger and more diverse
172. Adams et al., supra note 124, at 1333.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 1348.
175. See Hirzel, supra note 77; Simons, supra note 64; Weaver, supra note 35, at 310.
176. See generally Colombo, supra note 102 (discussing the benefits of virtue directed
decision making in the corporate sector, ways to promote corporate decision-makers to use
noneconomic factors in their evaluations, and the potential roadblocks to moral decision
making).
177. See Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 277
(1988).
178. See Stubbs, supra note 15, at 8 (quoting one social enterprise: “[W]e’re also driven
by growth because of the impacts; the bigger we are the more clients we have, the more
impact we can have, the more money we have to actually put towards positive investments.”).
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workforce.179  Founders and managers will need to educate employees on
filtering ethical decisions through a matrix of social and economic goals—
and then teach practical steps for how to do so.  They will also need to
reward employees who put their training successfully into practice in ways
that do not detract from the firm’s mission.  Admittedly, this can be a chal-
lenge for social enterprises because some may perceive training as taking
funds away from their social mission.  While this sentiment is laudable,
managers must not let it distract from the potential long-term problems
that can arise when ethics training receives short shrift.
Still, even the best training programs must accept that virtue and ethics
cannot always be taught.  These traits develop over a long period of time,
beginning at an early age, and mature from influences that are not exclu-
sively in a firm’s control.  More importantly, the value-setting influence of
culture and environment becomes strongest when individuals start out re-
ceptive to their influence.  This explains why corporate codes of conduct
and policy manuals are generally most effective at moderating behavior
when agents agree with what they are trying to accomplish from the out-
set.180  People bring their morals and beliefs with them when they show up
to work, and formal and informal efforts at internalization are simply less
challenging when the targeted group is already heading in the right
direction.181
Accordingly, a social enterprise’s hiring strategy will ideally involve an
assessment of a candidate’s pre-existing values and her ability to appreci-
ate the need for balance and contemplation that is essential in promoting a
hybrid purpose.182  The importance of this review comes on top of ap-
praising a candidate’s intelligence, technical ability, and similar job-spe-
cific traits.  The aim would be to look into a candidate’s character,
searching for evidence of universalism, honesty, benevolence, compassion,
public service, prudence, trustworthiness, and experience in the social en-
terprise sector.  Signs of trustworthiness in particular suggest lesser risk of
opportunistic behavior, especially when spread throughout groups of em-
ployees.183  It similarly befits social enterprises to gauge a candidate’s
source of personal drive.  Some individuals motivate themselves intrinsi-
cally out of a desire to act a certain way, while others require extrinsic
stimulation in the form of either reward or punishment.  These differences
are important because compliance research reveals that agents who rely
179. Battilana et al., supra note 14, at 54.
180. See Weaver, supra note 35, at 300–02.
181. See Gustavo Grullon et al., Religion and Corporate (Mis)Behavior (Feb. 12, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1472118;
Hilary & Hui, supra note 149, at 455 (“In actuality, firms do not make decisions, people do
and what they do outside work is likely to affect the ways they make these decisions inside
work.”).
182. Colombo, supra note 102, at 76–77 (“For an ethics training program to bear fruit, it
would seem as though its participants would need to be already in possession of a modicum
of virtue.”).
183. See Licht, supra note 117, at 13.
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on extrinsic motivation are less likely to act consistently with organiza-
tional values absent concrete external stimuli.184  In contrast, the compli-
ance tendencies of people disposed toward intrinsic motivation are more
reliable and less wavering in the face of new or evolving ethical
situations.185
Finally, social enterprises must not overlook the importance of retain-
ing at least some employees and advisors who are proficient in formal
compliance measures.  As noted earlier, many people drawn to social en-
terprises are idealistic and optimistic.  This is one of the best features of
the sector, but it suggests that some managers and employees may need
additional grounding in complicated regulatory requirements.  Being mis-
sion-driven is obviously helpful, but agents will court potential problems if
they let the idea of doing good distract from less exciting bureaucratic ob-
ligations.  Gaining (or hiring) the experience necessary to navigate murky
compliance waters is an important step in preserving the ability to take
advantage of the unique structural and cultural benefits that follow from
organizing as a social enterprise.  This concern only increases as firm size
decreases.  Smaller firms of all types, and particularly those with fewer
capital resources, are more likely to commit routine compliance mis-
takes.186  Fortunately, in addition to the availability of standard auditors,
the recent rise of the social auditing industry increased the number of or-
ganizations devoted to social and environmental performance auditing.187
Retaining a social auditor adds another cost, but many free social auditing
services exist, and, in any event, cost concerns must be balanced against
the unique compliance issues that social enterprises present.
B. Engage with Stakeholders
Any assessment of social enterprise governance provides good occa-
sion to revisit the importance of regular stakeholder engagement.
Whether talking about traditional or non-traditional firms, employee re-
ceptivity to values increases when managers proactively communicate the
reasons why they are significant and then meaningfully solicit feedback
and questions.188  Doing so creates a greater sense of shared responsibility
between management and employees.189  It also bolsters feelings of proce-
184. Tyler, supra note 43, at 273.
185. Id.
186. See Elizabeth K. Keating et al., The Single Audit Act: How Compliant Are Non-
profit Organizations? (Harvard Univ. Hauser Ctr., Working Paper No. 16, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=372263 (describing the compliance rates of different sized nonprofit
organizations with tax regulations).
187. See Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in Global Com-
merce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325, 337–38 (2008).
188. See Weaver, supra note 35, at 309.
189. See id. at 297; see also Yockey, supra note 16, at 34 (“[Agents] are more likely to
accept and abide by organizational directives and norms, and to resist pressures to go against
them, when they have a thorough understanding of the reasons behind them and feel they
play a meaningful part in their development.”) (citations omitted).
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dural fairness within the organization and makes managers’ messaging
take on more force.190  In turn, employees who feel they are treated fairly
and valued by management report higher levels of job satisfaction and
conscientiousness—results shown to stimulate ethical behavior, particu-
larly when employees are able to observe and interact with managers who
model the same ethical values that they preach.191
These findings are especially significant for social enterprises.  On their
own, formal compliance structures and policies are often insufficient to
provide agents with the tools necessary to address fluid and uncertain ethi-
cal challenges.192  How leaders counsel their employees on these issues
thus becomes strongly predictive.  If they provide ongoing counseling from
the perspective of shareholder primacy or avoiding sanctions, agents will
start to focus less on the core values of the social enterprise and more on
attitudes of self-interest.193  On the other hand, if managers frame deci-
sions by balancing stakeholder interests and promoting mission, then em-
ployees are more likely to mimic that behavior.  This should be easier for
social enterprises because they already attract talent that tends toward
greater emotional commitment to the desired organizational values.  So-
cial enterprises that organize as PBCs will further benefit from the form’s
structural requirements that mandate a stakeholder-centric perspective on
governance.  The managers who work for these firms must justify their
decisions to a wide range of corporate constituents, forcing them to assess
multiple (and potentially competing) interests a part of their everyday
lives.
C. Promote Board Heterogeneity and Diversity of Expertise
Social enterprises adopting the corporate form—as either traditional
for-profit corporations or as PBCs—will by necessity feature the archetyp-
ical legal compliance structure: the board of directors.  As noted, a social
enterprise’s hybrid purpose makes managers and directors responsible for
balancing the values and interests of a diverse group of stakeholders.
Traditional for-profit corporations must stay attuned to these groups as
well, but they have the luxury of falling back on the relatively clear fiduci-
ary guidepost of shareholder primacy.  In that case, and with firms that
value profits above all else, a homogenous board—composed of people
from strong business and economic backgrounds—may function well.
These directors will know what is expected and to whom they are princi-
pally accountable, and shareholders can adjust their monitoring efforts
accordingly.
The board situation becomes more complicated in a social enterprise.
Because directors need to weigh the firm’s mission against the goals and
190. See Weaver, supra note 35, at 309.
191. See id.; Hess et al., supra note 37; Phillips et al., supra note 103.
192. See Yockey, supra note 55, at 373–75.
193. See Weaver, supra note 35, at 297–98.
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values of multiple constituencies, the board’s diversity and its composite
level of expertise take on greater importance.  On one hand, the board’s
very legitimacy—and thus its ability to positively shape corporate cul-
ture—may depend on how well it is understood to be safeguarding the
mission’s pursuit.  On the other hand, accomplishing that objective re-
quires insights from people who appreciate the diversity of factors affect-
ing its pursuit.  That is to say, social enterprise boards should be made up
of multiple members who are committed to the firm’s primary mission but
who also possess the skills and leadership necessary to understand the
complexity of their responsibilities.  They must provide strategic advice
about mission and monitor agents’ commitment to it.  This requires a
board with directors from multiple backgrounds and who vary along a
continuum of idealism and practicality.  Having too many directors who
look only at mission may result in a form of capture, where the sus-
tainability of the firm is put in doubt as issues like regulatory compliance
and capital formation receive less attention than social performance.
Likewise, an oversaturation of directors with traditional corporate back-
grounds increases the risk of mission drift and its negative attendant ef-
fects on corporate culture and compliance.
Crucially, the wisdom of having diverse boards is not about mandating
specific results.  The broad discretion that the business judgment rule
guarantees means that board decisions generally stand so long as directors
are informed, acting in good faith, and free from conflicts of interest.194
Rather, the benefit of board heterogeneity and diversity of expertise is
about process—the gathering and review of multiple viewpoints during
the steps that lead up to a particular outcome.195  Several states appear to
recognize the merits of this approach by requiring benefit corporations to
appoint a “benefit director” to monitor the promotion of social bene-
fits.196  A person in this position can act as a key “moderating influence,”
helping to ensure that issues like fidelity to mission feature in every high-
level discussion about business strategy.197  This is a sound idea regardless
of whether a social enterprise elects to organize as a PBC or other social-
enterprise-specific standard form.
194. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified on reh’g,
636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
195. See MARTIN GELTER & GENEVIEVE HELLERINGER, Constituency Directors and
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew
Gold & Paul Miller eds., Oxford Univ. Press, forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2341660.
196. Murray, supra note 141, at 209–12. The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation
provides that appointing a “benefit director” is mandatory for public companies. Murray,
supra note 29, at 4. Many states have enacted the Model, including California, New Jersey,
and New York. State by State Legislative Status: Enacted Legislation, BENEFIT CORP INFO.
CENTER, http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Oct. 29,
2014).
197. See GELTER & HELLERINGER, supra note 195.
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D. Reassess Enforcement Policy
Turning to a vantage point outside the firm, the social enterprise’s com-
pliance potential raises several issues for public enforcement policy.  One
issue is cost.  Strategies for external surveillance and prosecution are ex-
pensive and time consuming.198  Regulators cannot be everywhere.  Yet
structural, legal, and normative considerations suggest that social enter-
prises ought to be prone to compliance, which would lessen some of the
regulatory burden.  Most importantly, if the social enterprise’s internal dy-
namics translate to cheaper and less frequent enforcement activity, then
public resources can shift to areas of greater urgency.199
An obvious caveat is that regulators and prosecutors will need assur-
ance that social enterprises truly do approach compliance in a unique and
powerful way.  They will need the ability to analyze social enterprises dif-
ferently and discern whether a values-based culture is functioning to mini-
mize the chances of wrongdoing.  This poses a potential problem.
Enforcement agencies generally boast strong backgrounds in investiga-
tions, settlement negotiations, trials, appeals, and administrative hear-
ings.200  They often lack expertise or experience in corporate governance,
organizational culture, psychology, and sociology.201  As a result, they may
struggle to appreciate how a diverse range of organizational purposes and
cultures will affect corporate behavior.  Regulators similarly show an incli-
nation to take a one-size-fits-all approach to enforcement that emphasizes
efficiencies of scale.202  They appear less amenable to tailored enforce-
ment tactics that focus on whether firms of different size, form, and per-
198. See Tyler, supra note 43, at 269 (“The use of power, particularly coercive power . . .
requires a large expenditure of resources to obtain modest and limited amounts of influence
over others.”).
199. Id. at 272–73 (“Further, when legal authorities can call upon the values of the
regulated group to encourage desired behavior, either because of an internal ethical culture
or because of the legitimacy of legal authorities, society has more flexibility in how it deploys
its resources. In particular, it is better able to use collective resources to benefit the long-term
interests of the law since they are not immediately required to ensure public order.”); see also
Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 1419 (2002)
(“Lawyers and judges must make a judgment on the gravity of third-party injuries. They
should also weigh the mechanisms outside of criminal law for ameliorating collateral conse-
quences. The stronger and more available those mechanisms, the weaker the case for re-
straining criminal law to avoid third-party consequences. In a strong economy, job losses
from prosecuting firms weigh less heavily than in times when lost jobs are not easily replaced.
Similarly, care for dependent family members weighs less heavily against incarceration when
extended family, close friends, or adequate social services are available to provide care in the
offender’s place.”).
200. See Hasnas, supra note 56, at 23.
201. See id.
202. See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities
Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 29 (2008).
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sonnel will respond differently to varying external stimuli or compliance
strategies.203
The potential consequence of these failings cannot be understated.
Enforcement strategies that do not take firm differences into account are
likely to be inefficient.  For example, it is plausible that the unique market
pressures they face will make social enterprises more wary of non-legal
sanctions (e.g., public shaming and harm to reputation) than monetary
penalties.  The reputational consequences of wrongdoing or mission drift
will likely make it harder for them to attract and retain the employees,
customers, and investors who are so often drawn to social enterprises
chiefly because of their missions.  Knowing of such idiosyncrasies is key
for regulators who hope to avoid perceptions of unfairness.  In fact, if reg-
ulators fail to gain sufficient expertise to adequately evaluate the effects of
corporate culture and form, they could end up making matters worse.  A
sanctions-based mentality that disregards the quality of internal culture
may encourage more bad behavior rather than less.  Of course, this is not
to say that sanctions are irrelevant.  Sanctions are necessary to communi-
cate that misbehavior is wrong and worthy of punishment.  They are also
necessary to prevent firms from taking advantage of a sanction-less sys-
tem.  However, when sanctions begin to displace the role of culture and
values, they start to crowd out the latters’ benefits.204  Employees may
begin to act primarily out of self-interest and fear of sanction rather than
through a process of internalization.
Admittedly, a strong emphasis on sanctions can lead to some short-
term success (as parents of toddlers might attest), but it is rarely sustaina-
ble.205  It is primarily unsustainable because it overlooks that some indi-
viduals act in accordance with rules and the law purely because they
believe it is right and just to do so.  To quote Aquinas, “[m]en who are
well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than
by coercion, but men who are evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless
they are compelled.”206  What he means is that some people have natural
203. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, New Governance, Chief Pri-
vacy Officers, and the Corporate Management of Information Privacy in the United States: An
Initial Inquiry, 33 LAW & POL’Y 477, 480–82 (2011).
204. Colombo, supra note 102, at 22–23 (2012) (“Law is limited in its ability to make
people virtuous. According to some modern virtue ethicists, the development of virtue re-
quires liberty of action—the ability to choose ill in addition to choosing good. The coercive
power of law is largely at odds with this important voluntary dynamic, thereby frustrating the
development of virtue. This position is best articulated by Robert George, who has argued
that: ‘Morality . . . is, above all an internal matter, a matter of rectitude in choosing: one
becomes morally good precisely, and only, by doing the right thing for the right reason.’ If,
conversely, one conducts himself or herself appropriately out of fear of legal sanction, all that
is achieved is ‘outward conformity with what morality requires,’ via an appeal to ‘subrational
motives.’”).
205. Id. at 23 (“Do we consider ‘virtuous’ the individual who does not steal in the pres-
ence of a security guard, or instead the individual who does not steal in the absence of a
security guard?”).
206. See id.
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propensities that make them primarily responsive to a big regulatory stick.
Others, though, possess an inherent commitment to virtue.  For them, de-
faulting to a threat of sanctions will not produce higher likelihoods of com-
pliance. Instead, it signals that authorities view them with distrust and
misgiving.207  This approach threatens to undermine their intrinsic ten-
dency to act consistently with positive values, causing them instead to re-
vert to the problematic balancing of costs, benefits, and likelihood of
detection.208  If left unchecked, it can also poison an otherwise promising
organizational culture.
This analysis reveals two important lessons.  First, an undifferentiated
methodology to enforcement policy is practically imprudent.  Regulators
would be wise to take matters slowly and carefully when approaching busi-
ness associations, like social enterprises, that exhibit unique characteristics
relevant to compliance.  Similarly, to the extent they are not already doing
so, persons in positions of regulatory power need to spend more time de-
veloping the knowledge of organizational theories that go beyond the clas-
sic rational-actor model—or they need to be replaced by people who
will.209  Then, if a social enterprise’s institutional and cultural practices
reveal a legitimate commitment to ethical behavior, regulators will come
to realize that they are freer to use a lighter touch before turning to more
drastic measures.210  As the author explains in other work, this might in-
clude softer, less-expensive strategies like negotiation and appeals to self-
regulation.211  At the very least, our evolving understanding of psychol-
ogy, corporate culture, and social enterprise underscores the need for reg-
ulators and prosecutors to keep pace with insights from other disciplines
and develop new skill-sets and policies to complement them.
Second, regulators who are unable or unwilling to adopt a context-spe-
cific approach to enforcement will cast doubt on their own legitimacy.  By
way of illustration, it is assumed that most people will agree prosecutors
and judges should take a differentiated approach to cases involving young
children.  All other facts being equal, there would be outrage over impos-
ing identical sanctions for assault regardless of whether a perpetrator is
207. See Tyler, supra note 43, at 273 (“[T]he use of sanctions undermines value-based
motivations because it sends a message to the potential targets of the sanctions that the au-
thorities view them as untrustworthy and suspect. As a result, people become more suspi-
cious and less trusting of the law and legal authorities.”).
208. See Colombo, supra note 102, at 22–23. A sanctions-based policy is also misaligned
with the reality that many people take action without taking the time for rational delibera-
tion; see also Weaver, supra note 35, at 300–02.
209. See Yockey, supra note 55, at 373–75.
210. See Tyler, supra note 43, at 286 (“The pyramid of regulation is one example of the
application of this approach. Ayres and Braithwaite argue that everyone should initially be
approached through appeals to values. Most will respond. The few who do not can then be
treated as subject to punishment. In this manner, resources can be directed toward the small
group that needs surveillance and sanctioning while the majority, who respond to values, is
addressed in terms of appeals to values.”); see also Colombo, supra note 102, at 27.
211. See Yockey, supra note 55, at 325.
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five or thirty-five years old.  Moving to a far less extreme example, con-
sider how one might react if regulators approach a social enterprise that is
open and receptive to values-based compliance not by making an appeal
to ethical values but instead by only threatening sanctions.  For many, that
course, too, would be a model of inefficient governance.212  It sends a mes-
sage that regulators are out of tune with how their decisions affect broader
public policy concerns.  It also suggests that they are incapable of balanc-
ing the competing interests and social consequences that invariably come
into play in the pursuit of justice.213
E. Prioritize Collaboration and Dialogue
The final recommendation is perhaps the most difficult.  To fully ap-
preciate the compliance and enforcement implications of social enterprise
theory, the social enterprise field must commit to an ongoing discussion
about what corporate virtue and ethics truly ought to mean in this context.
There needs to be criteria for determining how social enterprise ideals
should shape behavior in specific cases—and particularly those that in-
volve moral ambiguity.  For example, consider the reference above to a
potential conflict regarding foreign bribery.  Should managers of a social
enterprise pay an illegal bribe when they believe it is morally justified?
And who decides the measure of morality?  Social entrepreneurs, custom-
ers, and prosecutors may bring very different perspectives to these ques-
tions.  Compliance and lawfulness have contested meanings depending on
one’s beliefs, worldview, and interpretative framework.  What looks en-
tirely justifiable to a social enterprise dedicated to clean energy expansion
may appear to a prosecutor as nothing other than a clear black-letter rules
violation.214
212. See Tyler, supra note 43, at 286.
213. See Brown, supra note 199, at 1384–85 (“Attention to third-party interests high-
lights that criminal practice is a regime not organized by overriding retributive or crime pre-
vention commitments but characterized by pragmatic balancing of competing interests. In
that mix, culpability, while a primary concern of criminal law, is neither the motivating goal
of criminal law nor an absolute constraint on an instrumentalist regime. Culpability remains
important . . . . But culpability is balanced against (among other things) civil and private
alternatives to criminal law (i.e., other means for achieving crime prevention), and the social
interests—third-party interests—affected by criminal law.”); see also R. Michael Cassidy,
Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty
to “Seek Justice”, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 673 (2006). (“By using a sledgehammer
where a scalpel may suffice, the prosecutor may not be pursuing a “substantial purpose”
within a fair reading of Rule 4.4.”).
214. A related problem is that it is often hard to separate aggressive but lawful behavior
from illegal actions that generate significant social harm. Unlike the harms that result from
non-corporate crimes such as rape or murder, the harms that follow from something like
bribing a customs official are difficult for many to see or judge. It’s difficult to imagine that
prosecutors possess the necessary socio-economic expertise to correctly make such determi-
nations in every situation. They may neglect to consider mitigating factors such as the social
harm-to-benefit ratio of a particular illegal action, or the challenge of accurately divining a
defendant’s mental state when facing situations like those involving bribe demands or
threats. Moreover, prosecutors’ eagerness to charge and settle may cause them to overlook
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The first step in making sense of these challenges is to open up chan-
nels of dialogue and education.  Assuming that they will respond fairly and
with integrity, regulators may not know of a particular moral or compli-
ance dilemma facing a social enterprise unless the latter tells them about
it.  The potential benefits of this approach will only increase as more par-
ties with skin in the game become involved.  Where a variety of stakehold-
ers weigh in on questions of ethics, virtue, and compliance—including not
just social enterprises and regulators, but consumers, trade groups, law-
yers, and religious leaders—not only is a consensus more likely to emerge,
but also the very process of hashing one out can make subsequent accept-
ance more tractable.215
To take one example, regulators might look differently on an issue like
anti-corruption enforcement if they learn from firms, religious groups, and
NGOs that the prospect of bribery demands is keeping social enterprises
out of certain countries, or that firms are not basing compliance decisions
along strictly cost-benefit lines.  Even if there will still be disagreement on
questions of what is morally right or wrong, simply talking about these
issues provides better information about the moral and practical complexi-
ties facing the parties involved.  This should impress upon regulators the
need to preserve a sense of fairness and public support.  It might also
prompt them to search for alternative strategies that obviate ethical ten-
sions in the first place.  For example, if DOJ personnel learn from credible,
well-meaning people that bribery risks are negating the benefit of social
enterprise activities, they may come to place more emphasis on mitigating
the demand-side problems of bribery through diplomacy and cooperation
with foreign counterparts.216  Taking anti-corruption enforcement in such
a protective direction would relieve some of the pressures that socially
oriented firms might confront in the field and allow them to more easily
the incentives that social enterprises have to monitor for illegality that are independent of the
risk of criminal sanction.
215. See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Indus-
try Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 428 (2011).
216. Alternatively, regulators might prioritize enforcement efforts in accordance with
the social harms caused by the offense at issue. For example, bribes paid in response to
extortionate threats or for the purpose of expediting the receipt of a legal benefit may war-
rant the lowest enforcement priority, especially when weighed against the social value of the
services provided by a social enterprise. Indeed, for all firms, this view is made at least par-
tially explicit through the FCPA’s exemptions for (1) “grease payments” that expedite the
performance of “routine governmental action” and (2) reasonable “promotion” expenses. 15
U.S.C. § 78dd-1. FCPA officials have also said informally that they do not focus on the little
things when making enforcement decisions, stressing that companies should not expect scru-
tiny for taking steps like buying foreign officials a nice dinner after a business meeting. This is
hardly surprising. Small payments that resemble gifts, grease payments that expedite goods
through customs, and payments made in response to extortion are likely to arouse public
sympathy rather than anger or blame. The “warm glow” that many associate with social en-
terprise could make them even more sympathetic in these circumstances. By contrast, when
bribes are paid to receive illegal benefits, they presumably deserve and receive a much higher
level of enforcement attention and moral condemnation. This is true regardless of firm type.
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focus on their core objectives of delivering valuable products and services.
By the same token, if they are not already doing so, social entrepreneurs
who interact with regulators and other groups ought to take the ancillary
harms of bribery more seriously—and see anti-bribery enforcement as
more legitimate—once their gaze expands beyond their direct business
objectives.
Neither of these results is likely to happen without a sincere process of
multi-stakeholder engagement and an openness to change.217  To get
there, a formal public-private association that includes representatives
from social enterprise, government, non-profits, and other groups can be
instrumental.  An association that forms for this purpose might be called
the “Social Enterprise Compliance Initiative” (SECI).  Because social en-
terprises feature a new blend of activities and pose unique compliance
concerns, the most significant benefit of such an association is that it can
bring actors together through public seminars, conferences, and lobbying
efforts to share knowledge and raise awareness about what life is like for
them on the ground.  For instance, company stories about issues like the
frequency of bribery demands from customs officials might lead to govern-
ment-sponsored experiments with online procurement systems or priva-
tized automated shipping programs.  Similarly, in the corporate
governance context, a process of multi-stakeholder collaboration can gen-
erate strategies for cost-effective auditing procedures within the social en-
terprise sector, methods for designing compensation and incentive
structures tailored to the needs of social enterprises, and professional net-
works that will make it easier for social enterprises to link up with socially
oriented investors and investment firms.218
Even beyond the impact of specific recommendations, the presence of
an association that operates with these goals in mind can play a positive
part in motivating good behavior and discouraging bad.  It has the poten-
tial to foster shared values and beliefs among the sector while simultane-
ously creating informal market pressures that encourage voluntary
217. See Parker, supra note 47.
218. Sticking with the example of bribery, another idea related to public-private collab-
oration is the possibility of leveraging collective action in order to strengthen the bargaining
power of social enterprises as they confront corrupt demands. One of the biggest challenges
for small firms is the feeling of helplessness they experience when corrupt officials make
bribery appear to be the only option to get anything done. Large firms may have the re-
sources and security to push back during negotiations over a corrupt payment, but small
firms typically do not. As a result, if social enterprises can put up a unified front in opposition
to bribery, it could start to level the playing field. There are many ways this might happen.
Firms can collect and disseminate information about corrupt practices/officials in particular
markets, perhaps by taking advantage of the speed of smart phones and social media. The
information they gather could eventually lead to databases of corruption hotspots that firms
can use to steer clear of areas that present the highest risks. It might also be worth sharing
with law enforcement officials as they seek to effectively allocate resources. Other options
include joint negotiations with government officials to minimize the number of one-on-one
interactions that each firm will need to experience, as well as informal partnerships with
larger firms that have the leverage to limit, if not avoid, bribe requests.
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compliance with those values.219  To be sure, none of this is to say that
governments should abandon enforcement against misbehaving firms, only
that regulators must balance their enforcement agenda to consider all rele-
vant forces.  Public-private collaboration advances this effort by fostering
collective engagement, innovation in crime prevention and detection, in-
formation sharing, and the development of common standards and norms.
One might reasonably wonder whether social enterprises will volunta-
rily cooperate with other groups if doing so means giving up the potential
competitive advantage of a proprietary compliance strategy.  Here again,
though, is why the unique makeup of social enterprises becomes so impor-
tant.  Firms that prioritize profits above other objectives often lack the
incentive to share helpful information with their competitors.220  In that
situation, firms that move early could see their profits slip as others start to
copy their techniques.  But by definition, profits are not the overriding
organizational purpose of a social enterprise.  The hybrid nature of social
enterprise thus creates more room for industry or sector-wide cooperation.
This observation is already coming to fruition.  Social enterprises fre-
quently cooperate to trigger group discounts and gain access to service
providers.221  They also exhibit a high degree of homogeneity and team-
work.  For example, Hoffman finds that social enterprises “seek a leader-
ship role in their industry,” noting that, “while other companies seek to
influence institutions to reduce regulations and external costs to protect
their advantage, [social enterprises] seek to influence institutions to draw
other companies into emulating them.”222  Comments from individual so-
cial entrepreneurs underscore this point. One notes as follows:
And I think maybe longer-term, helping to power a collective community
around challenging a new way of doing business and perhaps because we are
already on that journey, we feel a heightened level of responsibility to share
that with other businesses in the community that are sort of in tune towards
that but don’t necessarily have the confidence, or know that you can actually
do business in that way and really you don’t need to bend your values and that
there are the people alongside you doing business in that way.223
219. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Law’s Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transi-
tion, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 215, 284–88 (2004); Omarova, supra note 215, at 428; Yockey, supra
note 16.
220. See Peter Molk, The Puzzling Lack of Cooperatives, 88 TUL. L. REV. 899, 924
(2014).
221. Murray, supra note 29, at 44. Many social enterprises work with industry groups,
government agencies, and other stakeholders to develop standards for sustainable production
and industry practices. For example, in an effort to facilitate transparency and information
sharing, Seventh Generation, a social enterprise that manufactures ecologically friendly
cleaning products, now publicly discloses its product formulations so that competitors can
learn from its advances. See Hoffman, supra note 28, at 15. Other social enterprises interact
extensively with their suppliers and communities to establish mutually beneficial arrange-
ments on practices ranging from price and wage structures to employee training programs.
222. Hoffman, supra note 28, at 15.
223. Stubbs, supra note 15, at 10.
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Another says that organizing as a benefit corporation “opened me up
to a whole network of, not only like-minded people, but also people who
had achieved so much and that could inspire me to do the same.”224  In
this sense, social enterprises act as “institutional entrepreneurs . . . pro-
moting . . . practices that will eventually become established as industry
norms that all must follow.”225  They are part of an expanding ecosystem
that encourages and supports collaboration among similarly purpose-
driven businesses, investors, and employees.  One can expect that these
initial efforts at networking will translate just as effectively into the com-
pliance domain.
CONCLUSION
The rapid proliferation of social enterprises means that issues of corpo-
rate governance and compliance are increasingly pressing within the sec-
tor.  As demonstrated in this Article, formal compliance tools typically
require a complementary and reinforcing corporate culture to be success-
ful.  Social enterprises show promise in this regard by virtue of the norma-
tive values they embody.  Together with recent developments in social
psychology and new socially oriented business forms, they offer a unique
platform for modeling compliance strategies that reinforce mission-centric
ideals and take us beyond a stagnant shareholder primacy vision of the
firm.  More work remains to be done, but this result is of immediate rele-
vance to the growing number of social entrepreneurs and, in time, may
prove to be the social enterprise’s most significant contribution to corpo-
rate legal theory.
224. Id. at 11.
225. Hoffman, supra note 28, at 15.
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